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Just as domestic pollution can cause transnational 
externalities, domestic environmental regulation can create 
transnational ripple effects in other jurisdictions. In this Article, I 
show how chemical regulation-long a weak link in the network of 
U.S. environmental laws-is about to be reshaped and reformed 
through the extraterritorial ripple effects of new European Union 
legislation. Contributing to both international law and 
environmental law scholarship, this Article shows how 
transnational information flows can be harnessed to end the 
longstanding drought of data on chemical toxicity in the United 
States. · 
Part I of this Article critiques the U.S. chemical regulatory 
regime, arguing that a lack of toxicity testing and high statutory 
barriers to regulation have created a persistent data gap that has 
undermined public health and environmental protections. I then 
argue that the EU legislation offers a superior model for addressing 
chemical risks. The EU law makes toxicity testing a default 
requirement for thousands of chemicals produced or imported in 
Europe, encourages substitution away from hazardous chemicals, 
and shifts the burden of proof on the safety of the most hazardous 
classes of chemicals from government to industry. As a result of 
these innovations, this next-generation chemical regulatory regime 
rewards knowledge, rather than ignorance. 
In Part II of this Article, I shift to an analysis of 
transnational interactions in chemical regulation. I demonstrate 
that "regulatory turbulence" from the EU legislation-
extraterritorial political, legal, and commercial effects-is already 
changing the political and informational terrain for chemical 
regulation in the United States. Information on chemical risks, 
disclosed in Europe, will close longstanding data gaps in the United 
States and will help build support for reform of U.S. law. Even if 
the United States does not enact major legislative reforms, its 
chemical marketplace will increasingly be governed by European 
norms. Chemical regulation is therefore a case study in how 
transnational law and global information networks are shaping the 
future of American environmental law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chemical regulation is the lapdog of American environmental 
law. The primary chemical regulatory statute, the Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976 ("TSCA"), 1 lacks the sharp regulatory bite of most 
U.S. environmental laws. Virtually every expert panel that has 
examined the U.S. system of chemical regulation has concluded that it 
inadequately protects public health and the environment.2 Yet despite 
a chorus of criticism3 and growing concern over the health effects of 
chemical exposure, TSCA has been remarkably resistant to reform. It 
is among the weakest, and the least amended, of all of the federal 
environmental statutes.4 
1. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-92 (2006). 
2. See Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Taxies Data 
Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 636 n.40 (2008) (listing expert studies that express concern over the lack of 
information about adverse effects of chemicals); see also David Roe, Ready or Not: The Coming 
Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 641 n.59 (listing Government Accountability 
Office reports critical ofTSCA). 
3. For scholarly critiques of TSCA, see John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and 
REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 734-40 
(2008) [hereinafter Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH]; JohnS. Applegate, The Perils of 
Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 261, 315-30 (1991) [hereinafter Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk]; Mary L. 
Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use 
Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1822-25 (1989); Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal 
Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 313-15 (1999); 
Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed 
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1663-705 (2004) [hereinafter 
Wagner, Commons Ignorance]; Wagner, supra note 2, at 631-37. 
4. See Oversight on the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Chemicals Management 
Program at EPA: Hearing Before S. Comm. Environment & Public Works, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) 
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Chemical regulation in the United States is now being 
transformed, however, through the transnational effects of foreign 
legislation. In 2006, the European Union ("EU") enacted ambitious 
legislation called Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of 
Chemicals ("REACH"). 5 REACH is the pit bull of global chemical 
regulation. It accomplishes, in Europe, reforms in chemical regulation 
that have long been advocated by American environmental law 
scholars.6 REACH is the first major chemical regulatory regime in the 
world to shift the burden of proof on chemical safety from government 
to manufacturers, and it requires safety testing for thousands of 
chemicals on which there is limited or non-existent toxicity data in the 
United States.7 This vast new information from Europe will enrich the 
data-poor environment in which the United States has attempted to 
regulate chemicals since the mid-1970s. Europe's internal 
environmental law is going global, and the implementation of REACH 
in Europe now significantly increases the likelihood that chemical 
regulation in the United States will be reformed. 
The extraterritorial impact of REACH is just one example of a 
larger trend in which the EU is increasingly setting de facto global 
standards through its internal environmental legislation. The EU is 
the world's largest economy, and decisions in Brussels, applicable 
throughout the twenty-seven Member States of the EU, are affecting 
how products are designed and manufactured from Boston to Beijing. 
Since 2000, the EU has embarked on ambitious environmental 
lawmaking in areas such as chemical regulation, energy efficiency, 
hazardous waste, and climate change. Europe has in many cases 
supplanted the United States as the leading originator and exporter of 
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Lynn R. Goldman, Professor, Environmental Health Science, 
Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health) (''TSCA is probably the EPA 
statute that has seen the least change in the last 30 years."). 
5. Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L396) 1 (EC) [hereinafter REACH]. 
6. See, e.g., JohnS. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand 
for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1389-90 (2008) (advocating placing the burden 
of proof of chemical safety on chemical manufacturers); Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal 
Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public 
Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 128--35, 151-54 (arguing that TSCA's 
confidential business information provisions have been abused and need reform). 
7. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: COMPARISON OF U.S. AND 
RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES TO PROTECT AGAINST THE RISK OF TOXIC 
CHEMICALS 7 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07825.pdf ("TSCA does not 
require companies to develop information for either new or existing chemicals, whereas REACH 
generally requires companies to submit and, in some circumstances, requires companies to 
develop such information for both kinds of chemicals."). 
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environmental law innovation.8 With the United States' 
competitiveness and global influence at stake, scholars and 
policymakers need to understand the mechanisms through which 
European environmental law is affecting the United States and the 
globe.9 
This Article demonstrates how the transnational interactions 
of the EU and the United States, the two "green giants" of 
environmental law, 10 are shaping the future of chemical regulation. I 
bring two distinct literatures into conversation: domestic 
environmental law scholarship that has focused on problems of data 
generation and information management in the U.S. regulatory 
process, 11 and a separate international law and political science 
literature that has focused on the transnational interaction of 
8. The rise of Europe as a global standard-setter is a reversal of past trends in which U.S. 
innovations in domestic environmental law influenced European law. See GIANDOMENICO 
MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE 53 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996) (explaining that Europe has 
often benefited from the results of U.S. regulatory experiments). Examples of European imports 
of U.S. innovations include environmental impact review, tradeable emissions permits, pollution 
taxes, and advocacy of cost-benefit analysis in environmental law. Id. 
9. The rising European influence in global environmental affairs has been documented in 
both scholarly literature and the popular media. See, e.g., MARK SCHAPIRO, EXPOSED: THE TOXIC 
CHEMISTRY OF EVERYDAY PRODUCTS AND WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR AMERICAN POWER 8--10 (2007) 
(describing the increasing influence of EU environmental regulation in the United States); 
Ragnar E. Lofstedt & David Vogel, The Changing Character of Regulation: A Comparison of 
Europe and the United States, 21 RISK ANALYSIS: INT'L J. 399, 399-400 (2001) (listing European 
regulatory methods that have been adopted by the United States); Henrik Selin & Stacy D. 
VanDeveer, Raising Global Standards: Hazardous Substances and E- Waste Management in the 
European Union, ENVIRONMENT, Dec. 2006, at 6, 7 (stating that the EU has become a "global 
leader on hazardous substances policy"); David Wirth, The EU's New Impact on U.S. 
Environmental Regulation, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2007, at 91, 103-04 (arguing that 
EU policy is increasingly influencing U.S. environmental regulation); Tobias Buck, Standard 
Bearer: How the European Union Exports Its Laws, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, Analysis, at 13 
(describing the increasing global adoption of EU environmental innovations and the political and 
economic mechanisms through which the EU is exerting a global influence); Mark Schapiro, New 
Power for 'Old Europe', NATION, Dec. 27, 2004, at 11 (discussing the significance of REACH for 
the U.S. chemical industry). 
10. Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael E. Kraft, Series Foreword to GREEN GIANTS? 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, at vii (Norman J. 
Vig & Michael G. Faure eds., 2004). 
11. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 6, at 1377-1406 (discussing the gap between the supply 
and demand of data on chemical toxicity); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the 
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 197-209 (2004) (arguing that new information 
technologies will help to close data gaps and improve environmental protection); Douglas A. 
Kysar & James Salzman, Foreword: Making Sense of Information for Environmental Protection, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1350-61 (2008) (arguing that a central concern of environmental law is the 
development of information for regulatory decision making); James Salzman, Beyond the 
Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the Service Economy, 47 UCLA L. REV. 411, 480-88 
(1999) (advocating a variety of informational tools for environmental protection, with a focus on 
retailers as a leverage point for environmental improvement); Wagner, supra note 2, at 640-46 
(advocating using competition within industries to produce information on chemical toxicity). 
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domestic regulatory regimes. 12 By drawing on both sources, I show 
how transnational developments in environmental law can help repair 
the broken chemical regulatory regime in the United States. 
This Article proceeds in two main parts. In Part I, I argue that 
REACH represents a significant advance over TSCA for addressing 
chemical risks to public health and the environment. TSCA has been 
crippled by a data gap. It imposes stringent informational demands on 
regulatory authorities to restrict or ban a chemical, yet the statute 
provides few incentives for chemical manufacturers to develop the 
information necessary for effective risk assessment and regulation. 
Nearly thirty-five years after TSCA's enactment, we still lack detailed 
toxicity data for the vast majority of the chemicals that have been 
introduced into commerce in the United States. 13 We are conducting 
an uncontrolled experiment on the health effects of synthetic 
chemicals, with humans as the test subjects. 
REACH, in contrast to TSCA, frames incentives in favor of 
research and disclosure by making the provision of toxicity data a 
condition of access to the €537 billion European chemical market-the 
largest in the world. 14 REACH also shifts certain burdens of proof 
from government to industry, makes some hazardous chemicals 
subject to government authorization, and focuses systematically on 
identifying and promoting safer substitutes for hazardous chemicals.15 
12. See, e.g., DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY REGIMES 43-51 (2007) (discussing global regulatory coordination); Frank Dobbin et 
al., The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or 
Learning?, ANN. REV. Soc. 449, 450-62 (2007) (reviewing the literature on transnational 
diffusion of policies); David Lazer, Regulatory Interdependence and International Governance, 8 
J. EUR. PUB. POLY 474, 474--82 (2001) (discussing regulatory interdependence of states). For 
earlier examples of this literature, see RICHARD ROSE, LESSON-DRAWING IN PUBLIC POLICY: A 
GUIDE TO LEARNING ACROSS TIME AND SPACE 103-10 (1993); George Hoberg, Sleeping with an 
Elephant: The American Influence on Canadian Environmental Regulation, 11 J. PUB. POLY 107, 
107-25 (1991); Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics, 32 INT'L ORG. 881, 892-93 (1978). 
13. In 1994, the U.S. General Accounting Office estimated that EPA had reviewed the risks 
of only 2 percent of the 62,000 "existing" chemicals that had been introduced before 1979. U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES COULD 
MAKE THE ACT MORE EFFECTIVE 3 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152799.pdf. 
Since 1994, additional screening-level data has been developed for approximately two thousand 
High Production Volume chemicals, infra text accompanying notes 65--67, but data is still 
lacking for the vast majority of chemicals. 
14. The sales figures, compiled by the European Chemical Industry Council, are from 2007. 
See EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COUNCIL, PROFILE OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY (2009), 
http://www.cefic.org/factsandfigures/level02/profile_index.html. 
15. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL, REACH IN BRIEF 18 
(2007) [hereinafter REACH IN BRIEF], available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/ 
reach/pdf/2007_02_reach_in_brief.pdf (outlining data submission and authorization procedures of 
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While REACH still faces significant implementation challenges, this 
next-generation chemical regulation is likely to increase, at reasonable 
cost, protections for public health and the environment relative to U.S. 
law. Recent scholarship has emphasized elements of continuity 
between TSCA and REACH. 16 I argue, in contrast, that REACH 
represents a significant departure from the American paradigm of 
chemical regulation and offers an important model for policy reform in 
the United States. 
Part II examines chemical regulation through the lens of 
transnational regulatory theory and assesses the likely impacts of 
REACH on the United States. I show how legal norms, initially 
embodied in domestic legislation in one jurisdiction, can be 
transplanted horizontally to other jurisdictions. This process begins 
with what I call "regulatory turbulence," or extraterritorial political, 
commercial, and legal effects from internal legislation. In response to 
regulatory turbulence, other countries may pursue a path of 
regulatory coordination with the originating jurisdiction, overtly 
oppose the external influence (as in a trade conflict), or continue to 
maintain divergent environmental standards. 
The response of the United States to regulatory turbulence 
from REACH appears to be shifting from conflict to coordination. The 
United States is unlikely to adopt every component of REACH in the 
coming years. But REACH-like reforms may be enacted in U.S. law as 
major U.S. firms comply with REACH's requirements, industry 
objections to TSCA reform become weaker, and the toxicity data 
developed under REACH becomes widely available in the United 
States. 
This last factor-the transnational effect of information 
disclosure--has not received significant attention in the literature on 
transnational regulatory interactions, but it is likely to be a major 
driver of reform in U.S. chemical policy. Part II fills this gap in the 
literature by analyzing the transnational consequences of information 
disclosure regimes. With the EU acting as a global chemical 
information officer, disclosures in the EU are likely to provide needed 
REACH and stating that authorization may be withdrawn if a suitable substitute becomes 
available). 
16. See, e.g., Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 721 (despite some 
differences, "REACH follows many of TSCA's fundamental approaches to chemical regulation."); 
Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Precautionary Regulation of Chemicals in the U.S. and EU, in 
THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE (Jonathan 
B. Wiener et al. eds., forthcoming 2009) (finding similarities in the levels of precaution embodied 
in the European and U.S. systems of chemical regulation). 
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toxicity data in the United States. They will also alter the political 
playing field on which U.S. interest groups battle for influence. 
TSCA reform is not inevitable, of course. The future of TSCA 
rests with the Obama Administration and with Congress, which have 
many competing priorities. Yet even if TSCA is amended only 
partially, or not at all, REACH could still have a beneficial impact on 
the $637 billion U.S. chemical marketplace17 by prompting firms to 
reduce the use of hazardous substances, spurring global product 
innovation, and empowering consumers with health and safety 
information. REACH may also lead to a reevaluation of the toxic 
hazards that are regulated under a wide variety of U.S. environmental 
laws. One thing is clear: in examining the future of chemical 
regulation, we can no longer rely on a single-jurisdiction analysis. 
I. TSCA AND REACH: STRONGER CHEMICAL REGULATION 
ACROSS THE POND 
Chemical regulation involves collecting data on the physical 
and toxicological properties of chemicals, conducting risk assessments, 
and restricting chemicals deemed to pose unacceptable risks to human 
health or the environment. Chemical regulation governs the "front-
end" of the product life cycle, as it applies to chemicals marketed as 
useful products; it can be distinguished from the variety of 
environmental laws in the United States and EU regulating ''back-
end" chemical issues, such as waste disposal or toxic emissions from 
manufacturing processes. Ideally, chemical regulation should serve as 
an early-warning system, alerting regulators to a chemical's risks 
before it is widely dispersed through use in consumer goods or 
industrial processes, or through disposal in the environment. 18 
For decades, however, chemical regulation on both sides of the 
Atlantic has been plagued by a data drought: scientists and regulators 
lack the risk data that would allow them to assess whether exposure 
to a particular chemical, or chemicals in combination, is causing harm. 
More than 82,000 synthetic chemicals have been introduced into 
commerce in the United States, 19 and we produce or import over 73 
17. Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys: Chemicals (Jan. 2008), available at 
homepage.smc.edufthomas_phillip/rpUChemicals.pdf (2006 sales figures). 
18. See S. REP. No. 94-698, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4495 ("The 
most effective and efficient time to prevent unreasonable risks to public health or the 
environment is prior to first manufacture. It is at this point that the costs of regulation in terms 
of human suffering, jobs lost, wasted capital expenditures, and other costs are lowest."). 
19. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO 
IMPROVE EPA'S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 
2 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf. 
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billion pounds of chemicals per day. 20 More than 100,000 chemicals 
have been introduced in the EU.21 Human intake of chemicals is 
widespread. Recent biomonitoring studies, which analyze chemical 
contaminants in human tissue samples, have confirmed that synthetic 
chemicals are ubiquitous in the human body.22 Industrial chemicals 
have been identified in the umbilical cord blood of developing fetuses23 
and in human breast milk.24 Chemicals once thought to be safely 
contained in products, such as perfluorinated compounds used in 
textiles, cookware, and food packaging, are now present in virtually all 
people.25 And while exposure does not equal harm, detailed toxicity 
data that could connect exposure and harm has been scarce. 
In both jurisdictions, toxicity data has long been unavailable-
not because scientists are incapable of obtaining it, but because 
existing laws provide few requirements, or even incentives, to find it. 
Weak legislation has failed to counteract chemical manufacturers' 
underlying economic incentive to avoid testing,26 and after decades of 
20. See U.S. EPA, 2006 INVENTORY UPDATE REPORTING: DATA SUMMARY 15 (2006), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/iur/pubs/2006_data_summary.pdf (reporting approximately 
twenty-seven trillion pounds of chemicals produced or imported in the United States in 2005). 
This figure is likely an underestimate of total U.S. chemical production, because low-volume 
chemical production, below 25,000 pounds per year at one site, did not need to be reported to 
EPA. I d. at 1. 
21. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 3. 
22. In a 2003 biomonitoring study, the Environmental Working Group found that of 210 
synthetic chemical substances analyzed in a population of volunteers, 167 synthetic chemicals 
were present in the tissue of at least one person. JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVTL. WORKING 
GROUP, BODY BURDEN: THE POLLUTION IN PEOPLE 3 (2003), available at http:// 
archive.ewg.org/reportslbodyburden1/pdf/BBreport_final.pdf. On average, participants in the 
study had fifty-three carcinogens, fifty-eight known endocrine disrupting chemicals, fifty-three 
immunotoxins, and fifty-five chemicals linked to birth defects or abnormal development in their 
tissue samples. Id. For a detailed study of human exposure to chemicals, see generally NAT'L 
CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THIRD NATIONAL REPORT 
ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS 13-443 (2005). 
23. See JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, BODY BURDEN: THE 
POLLUTION IN NEWBORNS 13-15 (2005), available at http://ewg.org/reports_contentlbodyburden2/ 
pdf!bodyburden2_final-r2. pdf. 
24. Kim Hooper & Thomas A. McDonald, The PEDEs: An Emerging Environmental 
Challenge and Another Reason for Breast-Milk Monitoring Programs, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
387, 387 (2000). 
25. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF. FuND, NOT THAT INNOCENT: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN, EUROPEAN UNION, AND UNITED STATES POLICIES ON INDUSTRIAL 
CHEMICALS, at l-3 (2007). 
26. Chemical manufacturers have little incentive to conduct toxicity testing voluntarily 
because toxicity data is a form of informational commons. Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra 
note 3, at 1640--41. The benefits of additional toxicity information inure to society as a whole, 
while the costs of toxicity testing are privately borne. See id. at 1640 n.61 (stating that toxicity 
information is a public good and that providers "are not capturing the full economic benefit" of 
their production). No single manufacturer has an incentive to contribute to the informational 
commons because disclosure of toxicity data can lead to reductions in sales or to potential civil 
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chemical regulation on both sides of the Atlantic, we are still 
confronted with a persistent data drought. 
This data drought is a central concern of information-and-
environment literature, a subfield of environmental law scholarship 
that addresses the role of information management and disclosure in 
environmental protection. Scholars such as Wendy Wagner, John 
Applegate, Douglas Kysar, Jim Salzman, Rena Steinzor, and Mary 
Lyndon have demonstrated that data gaps are often the result of 
legislative choices and regulatory ossification, rather than the result 
of any inherent inability of science to obtain the data.27 For example, 
regulators often operate in data-poor environments because of trade 
secret protections, high statutory barriers to collecting data, stringent 
judicial review requirements, and endless disputes over data accuracy 
and quality control.28 Accordingly, changes to the way environmental 
information is gathered and managed in the regulatory process could 
produce breakthroughs in understanding of toxic risks and m 
protection of public health and the environment. 
This Part argues that REACH offers a superior model for 
developing and managing such information on toxic risks. It begins 
with a critical examination of TSCA and then assesses the new 
paradigm of regulation embodied in REACH. 
A. TSCA's Troubles 
Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 to generate "adequate data" on 
the effects of chemicals and to provide "adequate authority" to EPA to 
regulate chemicals that "present an unreasonable risk of injury to 
liability. Id. at 1636-37. Government regulation therefore becomes necessary to overcome what 
Wagner has identified as manufacturers' "strategic ignorance," their underlying incentive not to 
find and disclose toxicity information. Id. at 1682, 1726. 
27. See Applegate, supra note 6, at 1395-96 (advocating reducing data demand by lowering 
the informational predicates for regulatory action); Esty, supra note 11, at 142 (arguing that 
high transaction costs for private parties to collect environmentally-relevant information suggest 
the need for regulatory agencies to fill the gaps); Kysar & Salzman, supra note 11, at 1350 
(presenting a model of how information flows through regulatory institutions); Sidney A. Shapiro 
& Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1769 
(2008) (supporting well-publicized informational metrics that would focus the public and 
oversight authorities on an agency's core missions); Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 3, 
at 1791 (suggesting institutional and legal reforms to cope with the toxicity data gap). 
28. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1601 (2008) (noting examples of agency misuse of scientific information); Mary L. Lyndon, 
Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 491-501 (2007) (trade secret 
protections); infra text accompanying note 39 (statutory barriers); infra text accompanying note 
45 Gudicial review requirements). 
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health or the environment."29 Nearly thirty-five years later, TSCA's 
promise has remained unfulfilled. In January 2009, the Government 
Accountability Office ("GAO"), noting longstanding weaknesses in 
chemical regulation, put the EPA toxics regulatory program on its 
biannual list of "High Risk" government programs.30 These are 
programs that need ''broad based transformation" and priority 
attention from the new administration and Congress. 31 
The fundamental problem with TSCA is that it both limits 
information supply and creates a high regulatory demand for 
information before EPA can restrict a chemical.32 The result is 
regulatory paralysis. 
1. Limited Information Supply 
TSCA chokes the supply of information on chemical toxicity 
through several prov1s10ns. Most importantly, TSCA exempts 
manufacturers of chemicals that were in commerce before 1979 
(known as "existing" chemicals in TSCA parlance) from routinely 
providing information about the toxicity of those chemicals to EPA.33 
This exemption has no basis in toxicology. Instead, it reflects the 
lobbying strength of the chemical industry, which worked assiduously 
to obtain this legislative grandfathering of all existing chemicals to 
avoid the expense (and liability exposure) of testing chemicals already 
on the market.34 Congress's acquiescence in 1976 has severely 
undermined the effectiveness of the statute. About 64,000 of the 
82,000 chemicals (78 percent) that have been introduced in the United 
States are "existing" chemicals that are grandfathered under the 
29. TSCA § 1, 15 U.S. C. § 2601 (2006). 
30. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN 
UPDATE 22 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927l.pdf. 
31. ld. at 9, 21 ("Without greater attention to EPA's efforts to assess toxic chemicals, the 
nation lacks assurance that human health and the environment are adequately protected."). 
32. John S. Applegate & Robert L. Fischman, Missing Information: The Scientific Data Gap 
in Conservation and Chemical Regulation, 83 IND. L.J. 399, 402-03 (2008). 
33. See TSCA § 5(a) (pre-manufacture notices required only for new chemicals introduced 
after 1979). EPA can require testing of existing chemicals on a case-by-case basis, but there are 
numerous hurdles to promulgating and enforcing a test rule. See infra text accompanying notes 
38-41 (describing statutory and judicial hurdles); TSCA § 4(a) (listing required agency findings 
before testing). 
34. The old-new distinction in TSCA provided a means of reducing political opposition from 
the chemical industry by regulating new entrants and leaving existing products untouched. 
Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 732. 
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Act. 35 By volume, the grandfathered "existing" chemicals represent 
about 99 percent of chemicals on the U.S. market. 86 
The default presumption of TSCA, therefore, is that the vast 
majority of chemicals can be freely marketed, even absent any toxicity 
testing, unless and until EPA can prove that they pose unreasonable 
risks. This presumption stands in marked contrast to the regulatory 
regimes the United States has established for the introduction of 
pesticides and pharmaceuticals, where the applicant has the burden of 
proving safety.37 Moreover, by creating sharply divergent regulatory 
standards for "existing" chemicals and "new" chemicals (those 
introduced after 1979), TSCA retards innovation and provides 
continuing incentives for use of older, untested chemicals.38 
Even under the "new" chemicals program, which is generally 
seen as more stringent than the program for existing chemicals, TSCA 
has failed to produce extensive data on health and environmental 
risks. Under TSCA, new chemicals undergo a premanufacture notice 
procedure, in which chemical manufacturers submit to EPA data 
about the physical and chemical properties of the substance and 
projected uses.39 Manufacturers must disclose toxicity information 
about a new chemical only if it is in the manufacturer's "possession or 
control" or if it is "known to or reasonably ascertainable by" the 
35. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 2, 4. 
36. Joel A. Tickner et al., The U.S. Experience in Promoting Sustainable Chemistry, 12 
ENVTL. SCI. & POLLUTION RES. 115, 116 (2005). 
37. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 735. 
38. Applying new environmental standards only to new entrants is a common feature in 
U.S. environmental law. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A 
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1270 (1981). Such grandfathering provisions can 
retard industry innovation and often provide a competitive advantage to existing facilities or 
practices. Such grandfathering is often justified on the grounds that it would be unreasonably 
costly to retrofit existing plants to conform to the latest pollution control standards, and on the 
grounds that existing plants will soon cease operation, due to natural turnover in the capital 
stock. These assumptions have not proven correct even in the case of major stationary sources of 
emissions. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677, 1708-09 
(2007) (discussing evidence that grandfathering provisions result in delayed plant retirement). 
And these assumptions clearly do not hold in the context of chemical regulation. Older, "existing'' 
chemicals should be subject to testing because they can continue to be used for decades, they are 
usually produced in the highest volumes, and they are unlikely to be phased out due to years in 
use. 
39. TSCA § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2006). EPA has ninety days to object or seek more 
information before the manufacture of new chemicals (or significant new uses of existing 
chemicals) can commence. TSCA § 5(c). As of June 2005, EPA review of premanufacture notices 
resulted in some action being taken to reduce risks of over 3,500 of the 32,000 new chemicals 
that companies have submitted for review since TSCA's enactment. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: APPROACHES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06217r.pdf. 
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submitter.40 With this "disclose it if you have it" model, a rational firm 
is incentivized not to undertake toxicity research on the products it is 
bringing to market.41 
TSCA does authorize regulators to compel testing for any 
chemical (existing or new), but the regulators carry a heavy burden. 
EPA can order testing under Section 4 of TSCA if EPA meets a series 
of regulatory hurdles in which it carries the burden of proof.42 These 
hurdles in many cases place the agency in a Catch-22 by requiring a 
quantitative risk assessment on a chemical before EPA can issue a 
testing order to obtain more information about that chemical.43 
Finalizing a test rule can take between two and ten years, 44 and EPA's 
testing orders are considered rulemakings under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, subject to "substantial evidence" judicial review.45 EPA 
has neither a legislative mandate nor the staff and funding to conduct 
comprehensive toxicity testing for existing chemicals. The agency has 
issued formal TSCA testing orders for fewer than 200 of the 62,000 
existing chemicals,46 and these orders have frequently been delayed or 
withdrawn after litigation.47 
Because of the hurdles to testing under Section 4 and the 
weaknesses of other information disclosure provisions of TSCA,48 
40. 40 C.F.R. § 720.50(a)-(b) (2009). 
41. Not surprisingly, only 15 percent of PMNs contain any health and safety information, 
and the GAO has reported that only 20 percent of PMNs receive a detailed review by EPA. 
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 12. In the absence of chemical-specific test 
data, EPA uses computer models and structure activity relationships ("SARs") to compare new 
chemicals with chemicals of similar molecular structure on which toxicity data is available. Id. at 
11. 
42. Specifically, EPA can require additional testing only when the agency finds that the 
chemical (1) may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment; or (2) is or 
will be produced in substantial quantities, and (a) there is or may be significant or substantial 
human exposure to the chemical or (b) the chemical enters or may reasonably be anticipated to 
enter the environment in substantial quantities. TSCA § 4(a). 
43. See Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk, supra note 3, at 319 (noting that in 
practice, EPA often conducts a quantitative risk assessment on a chemical prior to issuance of a 
test order); see also Daniel A. Farber, Five Regulatory Lessons from REACH 9 (Univ. Cal. 
Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 1,301,306, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301306 (arguing that TSCA embodies a "reverse precautionary 
principle" because it allows "information to be gathered only when a risk is already known to 
exist"). 
44. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9. 
45. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B). 
46. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 4. 
47. Id. at 18. 
48. TSCA Section 8, for example, imposes a requirement to "immediately inform" EPA if a 
manufacturer, processor, or distributor of a chemical obtains studies or data indicating that a 
chemical poses a "substantial risk" of injury to human health or the environment. TSCA § 8(e). 
In practice, the intended early warning system of Section 8 has not promoted consistent 
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chemical regulation in the United States has operated in a data-poor 
environment that benefits the chemical industry but undermines 
regulators' ability to understand, let alone respond to, public health 
and environmental risks from chemicals. Other information disclosure 
statutes-such as the Freedom of Information Act of 1966,49 the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,50 and the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 198651-have become 
cornerstones of environmental protection in the United States. TSCA 
constricts far more than it reveals. 
2. Stringent Information Demands 
Within this data-poor environment, TSCA imposes stringent 
information demands on EPA before the agency can restrict a 
chemical, and the burden of proof on chemical safety lies with the 
government. EPA is authorized under TSCA Section 6 to restrict a 
chemical (e.g., ban, limit certain uses, or impose labeling 
requirements) only if it can show a "reasonable basis to conclude that 
. . . a chemical . . . presents or will present an unreasonable risk of 
injury to health or the environment."52 "Unreasonable risk" is an 
undefined term in the statute, but it has been interpreted to require a 
complex balancing of hazard, exposure, cost, and socioeconomic data, 
reporting to regulatory authorities, and it instead creates perverse incentives not to undertake 
voluntary testing of chemicals. Determining whether a study suggests a "substantial risk" from a 
chemical is left largely to the discretion of the manufacturer. See Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA 
and REACH, supra note 3, at 736 ("Both Congress and the EPA define 'substantial risk' in a way 
that leaves reporting largely to the manufacturer's own judgment."). Moreover, manufacturer 
compliance with Section 8 has been sporadic. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 3 (testimony of Lynn 
R. Goldman) (noting recurring problems with companies withholding data required to be 
disclosed under Section 8). In the early 1990s, EPA established a self-audit program that offered 
firms reduced penalties and penalty caps in exchange for implementing a compliance audit 
program requiring them to submit overdue Section 8 data. More than 120 companies sent EPA 
more than 11,000 studies on chemicals that had never been seen by the agency and that should 
have been submitted years earlier. See Keith M. Casto & Tiffany Potter, Environmental Audits: 
Barriers, Opportunities, and a Recommendation, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 233, 
251 (Spring 1999). 
49. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2008). 
50. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 
(2000). 
51. Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-05, 
11021-23, 11040-50 (2000). 
52. Specifically, the statute states: If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable 
basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of 
a chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, presents or will 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, the Administrator shall" 
restrict the chemical "to the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the 
least burdensome requirements[.]" TSCA § 6(a). 
1830 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:6:1817 
all of which must be compiled by the government. 53 Moreover, EPA 
can enact restrictions on a chemical only after a full trial-type hearing; 
it must make a series of statutory findings prior to restrictions; it 
must choose the "least burdensome" regulatory requirement that will 
adequately protect against the risk; and it must demonstrate that no 
other statute could address the concern. 54 EPA chemical restrictions, 
like test rules, are then subject to the searching "substantial evidence" 
standard by a reviewing court. 55 
Confronted with a persistent data drought, yet bearing the 
burden of proof, EPA has imposed regulatory restrictions on only five 
chemicals under Section 6 in the thirty-three year history of TSCA. 56 
The last attempt to do so was in 1989, when EPA promulgated a rule 
banning most uses of asbestos, based on ten years of hearings and a 
100,000 page record. 57 That rule was set aside in Corrosion Proof 
Fittings v. EPA,58 the first and only judicial interpretation of Section 
6. In that case, the Fifth Circuit faulted EPA's cost-benefit analyses, 
the broad sweep of the EPA rule, and EPA's compliance with the 
"least burdensome" requirement. After Corrosion Proof Fittings set 
such high demands for data, scientific certainty, and proof of cost-
effectiveness prior to regulation, EPA never again attempted to 
exercise its statutory authority under Section 6 to restrict or ban a 
chemical substance. 
The regulatory model of TSCA is fundamentally flawed. It is 
akin to conducting a criminal prosecution without a factual 
investigation, or conducting a civil trial without discovery. The 
government bears the burden of proof but operates with severe 
53. See TSCA § 6(c) (outlining the factors that must be considered and published in any 
chemical restriction rule promulgated by EPA); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 
1215-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the "unreasonable risk" standard to include analysis of the 
costs of any proposed restriction); Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 
756 ("The 'unreasonable' terminology in TSCA is notably unspecific, and intentionally so, but it 
is clear that EPA must consider cost as well as risk in the determinations of 'unreasonable risk.' 
"). 
54. TSCA § 6 (a), (c). 
55. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B). 
56. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 18. The five chemicals or chemical 
classes are polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), fully halogenated chlorofluoroalkanes, dioxin, 
asbestos, and hexavalent chromium. Id. 
57. See 40 CFR §§ 763.160-763.179 (1989) (Subpart I, prohibiting "the Manufacture, 
Importation, Processing and Distribution" of various asbestos products). As the GAO has noted, 
Corrosion Proof Fittings was widely considered to be a severe blow to EPA and to the 
effectiveness of TSCA because "asbestos is generally regarded as one of the substances for which 
EPA has the most scientific evidence or documentation of substantial adverse health effects." 
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 20. 
58. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229-30. For additional discussion of Corrosion 
Proof Fittings, see Farber, supra note 43, at 12-14. 
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information deficits. John Applegate has noted that under these 
conditions "agencies undertake less regulation, not because they have 
made a judgment that regulatory action is unnecessary, but because 
they cannot afford the high costs of developing a record that will be 
fairly certain to withstand judicial review."59 
3. Implications of TSCA's Failures 
Mter decades of chemical regulation in the United States, 
there is still widespread ignorance and uncertainty about the actual 
effects of tens of thousands of chemicals on human health and the 
environment. Some chemicals that have gone untested for decades 
may be completely harmless; others may be unidentified agents of 
endocrine disruption, birth defects, cancer, or neurological damage. 
The crucial point is that the United States lacks a sophisticated 
system for obtaining the risk data that would allow regulators, firms, 
and consumers to distinguish harmful (or potentially harmful) 
chemicals from harmless ones. 
If TSCA were more effective at generating data on chemical 
risks, that data could feed other policy decisions-such as which 
substances to regulate as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean 
Air Act, how stringent cleanup standards should be for hazardous 
waste sites, or how to set permissible chemical exposure levels for 
workers under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. TSCA was 
designed to be a gap-filling, cross-cutting regulatory regime that could 
address risks from tens of thousands of chemicals across their life 
cycles, from production to disposal. 60 Indeed, Congress intended TSCA 
to complement other environmental statutes that are more focused on 
controlling end-of-pipe emissions into particular media, such as air or 
water.61 Yet TSCA has never fulfilled its promise for generating the 
data that might advance priority-setting and bring coherence to the 
larger field of taxies regulation. 62 
59. Applegate, Perils of Unreasonable Risk, supra note 3, at 266. 
60. See S. REP. No. 94-698, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491 ("The purpose 
of S. 3149 is to prevent unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment associated with 
the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of chemical substances. 
The bill is designed to fill a number of regulatory gaps which currently exist."). 
61. See Applegate, Perils of Unreasonable Risk, supra note 3, at 330 ("As an umbrella for 
collecting, coordinating, and creating information, [TSCA] ... has the potential to be the vehicle 
for supplying data to other regulatory programs .... "). 
62. See John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (arguing that the differences among the lists of hazardous 
substances regulated under various environmental statutes are "a major underlying reason for 
costliness and inefficiency in the current regulatory structure."). 
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Despite these flaws, TSCA has remained remarkably resistant 
to reform. Bills proposing increased mandatory testing of existing 
chemicals have been rejected in Congress. 63 Some minor provisions 
have been added to TSCA to address hazards from specific 
chemicals, 64 but the core legal tests and the underlying structure of 
American chemical regulation have not changed since the 1970s. The 
chemical industry's principal trade group, the American Chemistry 
Council ("ACC"), has long supported the TSCA status quo and has 
opposed mandatory testing requirements.65 
Today, TSCA exists mainly as a statutory backdrop to a series 
of voluntary initiatives on chemical safety, negotiated between EPA 
and industry groups. 66 Many industry commitments under these 
initiatives remain unfulfilled,67 and such initiatives are not a 
satisfactory substitute for an effective regulatory regime. When data 
gaps emerge in voluntary testing programs run by industry, EPA 
lacks the practical statutory authority to fill the gaps.68 TSCA, it 
63. In 1984, for example, the Senate rejected a TSCA amendment that would have required 
toxicity testing for very high volume chemicals-those produced or imported in annual quantities 
of 100 million pounds or more. SeeS. 3075, 98th Cong. § 4(b) (1984). 
64. TSCA had minor amendments in 1986 to address asbestos in schools, in 1988 to 
regulate indoor radon gas, and in 1992 to regulate hazards from lead paint. None of these 
amendments altered the core provisions or incentives of TSCA. See Robert B. Haemer, Reform of 
the Toxic Substances Control Act: Achieving Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 
ENVTL. L. 99, 119-22 (1999-2000). 
65. See DARYL DITZ, CTR. FOR lNT'L ENVTL. L., CLOUDY SKIES, CHANCE OF SUN: THE 
FORECAST FOR U.S. REFORM OF CHEMICAL POLICY 1, 2 (2006), available at http://www.ciel.org/ 
Publications/Cloudy_Skies_9May06.pdf ("The chemical industry remains satisfied with the law 
as it stands."). 
66. The largest of these voluntary initiatives has been the High Production Volume ("HPV'') 
Challenge, launched with great fanfare in 1998 as a joint project of the ACC (then known as the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association), the EPA, and the Environmental Defense Fund. Under 
the HPV Challenge, industry agreed to provide toxicity data on 2800 chemicals produced in 
volumes exceeding one million pounds per year, and individual chemical manufacturers agreed 
to "sponsor" the testing for particular chemicals. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF. FuND, HIGH 
HOPES, LOW MARKS: A FINAL REPORT CARD ON THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL 
CHALLENGE 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/6653_HighHopesLowMarks. 
pdf. 
67. Eleven years after the HPV Challenge was launched, and five years after the data sets 
were due, about 280 of the HPV chemicals still remain "orphans," lacking a sponsor to pay for 
their testing. See id. at 4. Moreover, manufacturers have submitted final data sets on just over 
half of the chemicals that were sponsored for testing. ld. at 3. EPA committed to mandate testing 
for any orphan chemicals under the HPV program, but EPA did not issue a test rule until 2006, 
and that rule covered only 16 of the 280 orphan chemicals. See EPA Regulatory Actions for 
Unsponsored Chemicals, http://www.epa.gov/HPV!pubs/general/regactions.htm (last visited Oct. 
8, 2009). Thus, the most ambitious effort ever undertaken in the United States to assess the 
toxicity of widely-used chemicals is still incomplete a decade after its inception. The 
Environmental Defense Fund concluded in 2007 that the program is still "well away from 
delivering on the promises it made." DENISON, supra note 66, at 3. 
68. See Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 740. 
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appears, has spawned voluntary testing initiatives by necessity.69 Its 
mandatory provisions are hollow, and reform of U.S. chemical 
regulation is urgently needed. 
B. Chemical Regulation Version 2.0: The Rise of REACH 
With the enactment of REACH in 2006, the EU launched a 
second generation of chemical regulation. The legislation is, in many 
respects, the "anti-TSCA"70-the transatlantic converse of the 
American regulatory regime. It fundamentally reshapes the £537 
billion European chemical market71 and embodies a new paradigm in 
global chemicals management in which the burden of proof on 
chemical safety is shifted from government to industry for the most 
hazardous classes of chemicals. REACH replaced an older package of 
EU chemical legislation (comprised of more than forty directives and 
regulations) that had been modeled closely on TSCA. 72 In enacting 
REACH, therefore, the EU largely rejected the American approach to 
chemical regulation, which had been the most influential regulatory 
regime from the 1970s through the 1990s, and embarked on a new 
path.73 
Like TSCA, EU chemical legislation prior to REACH focused on 
testing of "new" chemicals (those introduced after 1981 in Europe), 
exempted most existing chemicals from testing, and placed the burden 
of proof on EU Member States to prove that chemicals were unsafe. 74 
The older European legislation led to the same informational logjams 
and data gaps that the United States has experienced under TSCA. Of 
the 30,000 existing chemicals with annual production volumes in 
Europe of over one ton, only 140 had been identified as priorities for 
69. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 9 (because TSCA's testing 
provisions are ''burdensome and too time consuming for EPA to administer," EPA "uses 
voluntary programs to help gather more data to assess risks on certain chemicals"). 
70. Applegate, Synthesis of TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 7 43. 
71. See EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COUNCIL, supra note 14. 
72. For an overview of the origins of chemical legislation in the European Community, see 
RONALD BRICKMAN, SHEILA JASANOFF & THOMAS lLGEN, CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 276 (1985). For a concise summary 
of the EU chemical legislation that existed prior to REACH, see FRANK ACKERMAN & RACHEL 
MASSEY, GLOBAL DEV. & ENV'T lNST., TUFTS U., THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH 19-23 (2004), 
available at http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/TuftsStudyonREACH_tcm29-130918.pdf. 
73. For further information on European politics leading to REACH's enactment, see 
Henrik Selin, Coalition Politics and Chemicals Management in a Regulatory Ambitious Europe, 7 
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 63 (2007). 
74. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 3; Commission White Paper on Strategy for a 
Future Chemicals Policy, at 19, COM (2001) 88 final (Feb. 27, 2001) (noting the incentives for 
industry to delay risk assessments under the prior EU chemicals legislation). 
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testing under the prior legislation, and full risk assessments had been 
prepared for only about seventy of these chemicals. 75 Chemicals 
introduced since 1981 had been subject to rigorous toxicity testing in 
Europe, but they represented less than 1 percent of all the chemicals 
marketed in Europe. 76 
REACH was designed to break through these informational 
logjams by establishing, at reasonable cost,77 a unified, precautionary 
regulation for existing and new chemicals produced or imported into 
Europe. REACH improves on the American model of chemical 
regulation in four major respects: it (1) increases the supply of data on 
chemical toxicity, (2) decreases the informational demands on 
regulatory authorities, (3) improves risk communication to the public 
and to commercial users of chemicals, and ( 4) promotes use of 
substitutes for hazardous chemicals. 
1. Increased Information Supply: "No Data, No Market" 
To increase the supply of information on chemical risks, 
REACH ends the distinction between "existing" and "new" chemicals 
and imposes on industry a default burden of data production as a 
condition of manufacturing or importing chemicals into the EU. In 
particular, REACH requires that all substances imported into or 
manufactured in Europe in annual quantities of one ton or greater 
(approximately 30,000 substances) be registered with a new European 
Chemicals Agency ("ECHA") during a phase-in period that ends in 
2018. 78 The amount of toxicity testing that must accompany the 
75. See ANDREW FASEY, LOWELL CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE PROD., REACH IS HERE: THE 
POLITICS ARE OVER, NOW THE HARD WORK STARTS 3 (2008), www.chemicalspolicy.org 
/downloads/REACHisHere4-2008.pdf; Memorandum from the Directorate General 
Communication of the European Commission, Q and A on the New Chemicals Policy, REACH, 
MEM0/06/488 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=MEM0/06/ 488&format= PDF &aged= 1 &language= EN &guiLanguage=en. 
76. Commission White Paper, supra note 74, at 6. Of the new chemicals evaluated between 
1981 and 2003, the European Commission concluded that 70 percent had one or more dangerous 
properties. Commission Working Paper: Extended Impact Assessment, at 26-27, COM (2003) 644 
final (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/eia-
sec-2003_1171_en.pdf (discussing the knowledge gap created by the EU's earlier chemical 
regulations and its effect on accurate assessment of the risks of certain chemicals). 
77. The costs of REACH are addressed, infra, Part (I)(C). 
78. See REACH arts. 5-7, 20. Under REACH, ECHA plays a coordination role and provides 
the scientific expertise for evaluating chemicals. Actual regulatory authority, however, remains 
with the European Commission and the various Member States of the EU. See Applegate, 
Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 741. Joint registration is permitted when 
numerous firms manufacture or import the same product. REACH art. 11. The term 
"substances" includes most chemicals but excludes foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, many naturally 
occurring ores and minerals, and polymers. See REACH, Exemptions From the Obligation to 
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registration for each substance depends on the volume sold, with the 
greatest testing and information requirements applicable to chemicals 
produced or imported in volumes of more than 1,000 tons per year. 79 
REACH thereby achieves in Europe a major reform in chemical 
regulation that has long been advocated by American analysts-
putting older and newer chemicals on equal footing and requiring a 
minimum toxicity data set for both.80 REACH also expands, relative to 
U.S. practice, the number of required tests for adverse human health 
and environmental effects. 81 The registration process of REACH is the 
largest effort in history to collect comprehensive toxicity data for 
chemicals. 
Unlike TSCA, REACH is a true market-access regulation. It is 
based on the core principle of "No Data, No Market."82 In other words, 
a company's failure to submit the required chemical registration 
package, including the suite of toxicity data specified in the 
legislation, results in denial of access to the €537 billion European 
chemical market. The "No Data, No Market" principle is already 
making toxicity testing a routine part of doing business in Europe, 
rather than the exception, as it is in the United States. Firms have an 
incentive to generate the toxicity data that will allow their products to 
undergo registration as quickly as possible. The system rewards 
knowledge, rather than ignorance. 
As part of the registration process, REACH requires 
submission of two distinct kinds of chemical data: hazard data and 
Register in Accordance With Article 2(7)(a), Annex IV; REACH, Exemptions From the Obligation 
to Register in Accordance With Article 2(7)(b), Annex V (exempting certain substances, such as 
sugars, oils, amino acids, fatty acids, and "basic elemental substances for which hazards and 
risks are already well known" from the registration requirement). 
79. See REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 7 (explaining that under REACH, the tonnage of 
a chemical acts as a rough surrogate for potential exposure, so the amount of required testing 
escalates as the tonnage increases). Id. For the list of tests that must be conducted on substances 
in the different tonnage bands, see REACH Annex VII-X. 
80. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 41; Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA 
Reform: Building a Program That Can Work, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10034, 10040 (2009) ("[T]he best 
approach for addressing the age-old new versus existing chemical issue is to remove it from the 
discussion."). 
81. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 17, 43-47 (comparing the number 
of chemical tests under TSCA and REACH). One common criticism of REACH is that at low 
volume thresholds (between one and ten tons per year), REACH imposes relatively few testing 
requirements. Prior EU law required notification for all new substances marketed in excess of 
ten kilograms per year, so it is true that REACH has raised the tonnage threshold for new 
chemical testing. See DENISON, supra note 25, at 8-10. However, the European Commission 
retains the authority to require testing for low-volume substances on a case-by-case basis. See 
Commission White Paper, supra note 74, at 18. For chemicals produced or imported above ten 
tons per year (approximately 10,000 substances), REACH represents a significant improvement 
over prior EU legislation and over TSCA. 
82. REACH art. 5. 
1836 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:6:1817 
risk data. Hazard data refers to the intrinsic characteristics of a 
chemical, such as whether it is long-lived, persistent in the 
environment, or carcinogenic in laboratory mice. Hazard identification 
suggests a capacity to cause harm. Risk data, on the other hand, 
combines laboratory findings of hazard with analysis of actual human 
exposure to the compound. Risk, therefore, is the product of hazard 
and exposure. Risk assessment identifies the probability of harm. 
REACH requires that chemical manufacturers identify potential 
exposures and submit risk assessments as a part of the registration 
process, whereas in the United States risk assessments are a 
governmental responsibility and are not routinely performed for 
existing chemicals. Therefore, under REACH, the supply of risk 
assessment data on commonly used chemicals is likely to expand 
dramatically. 
This shift in the burden of data production has a potential 
drawback, however. Unless government regulators specifically select 
chemicals for further evaluation, the principal documentation on risks 
and exposures of registered chemicals will be prepared by industry. To 
address the potential for abuse under this system, the ECHA and 
Member States must devote adequate resources to fulfill their crucial 
oversight and auditing roles. 
2. Reductions in Information Demand: Authorization and Shifting 
Burdens of Proof 
In addition to expanding the data supply, REACH also narrows 
the existing chemical data gap by adjusting the regulatory demand for 
toxicity information. Recall that under TSCA, EPA bears the burden 
of proof to show that a chemical poses an "unreasonable risk" to 
human health or the environment prior to restricting a chemical.83 
REACH, in contrast, shifts the burden of proving the safety of certain 
classes of chemicals to industry, significantly reducing the 
informational demands on regulatory authorities.84 
Burden shifting is an important conceptual breakthrough in 
chemical regulation. It restructures the roles of industry and 
government in chemical regulation, sending a "normative message" 
that "chemical risks should be controlled, eliminated, mitigated, or 
83. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). 
84. See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 4 ("REACH is based on the 
principle that chemical companies have the responsibility to demonstrate that the chemicals 
they place on the market, distribute, or use do not adversely affect human health or the 
environment, while TSCA generally requires EPA to demonstrate that chemicals pose risks to 
human health or the environment prior to controlling risks .... "). 
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justified by their creators."85 Shifting the burden of proof on chemical 
safety is a reform that has long been advocated for TSCA by American 
environmental law scholars.86 Lynn Goldman, who oversaw TSCA 
implementation in the Clinton Administration, has argued that TSCA 
will "never be effective" unless it is amended to shift the burden of 
proof on chemical safety.s7 
Under a regulatory model that places the burden of proof for 
chemical safety on industry, scientific uncertainty will be resolved in 
favor of not allowing a chemical to be marketed. A governmental 
burden of proof, in contrast, heightens the possibility of false negative 
decisions (so-called "Type II errors") in which harmful chemicals are 
freely marketed because the government cannot meet its burden of 
showing harm in a context of scientific uncertainty.88 A well-designed 
chemical regulatory regime should aim, as REACH does, to minimize 
Type II errors because these errors can lead to adverse health and 
environmental effects from the distribution of harmful chemicals in 
commerce. 
Mter extensive negotiations between the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament, the EU enacted an authorization 
procedure for REACH that shifts the burden of proof on safety to 
industry for the most hazardous classes of chemicals: those identified 
as "very high concern" (''VHC") chemicals in the registration and 
evaluation stages of REACH.89 These are chemicals that can cause 
cancer, birth defects, or genetic mutations, as well as chemicals that 
are persistent or bioaccumulative in the environment.90 VHC 
chemicals are given a "sunset date" after which they cannot be sold in 
Europe without the industry proponent rece1vmg government 
authorization.91 The concept of a default sunset date for hazardous 
85. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 746. 
86. Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (testimony of Lynn R. Goldman); Sachs, supra note 3, at 
348-49; see also Applegate, supra note 6, at 1389 (advocating shifting the burden of proof on 
chemical safety to manufacturers a strategy to increase the supply of chemical data). 
87. Hearing, supra note 4, at 2 (testimony of Lynn R. Goldman). 
88. To be sure, an industry burden of proof heightens the possibility of Type I errors (false 
positive decisions in which a substance may be forced off the market even if it poses little or no 
actual risk). However, in balancing Type I and Type II errors, precautionary regulation should 
aim to minimize Type II errors, given the potential for adverse effects on human health and the 
environment. For more discussion on the balance of potential decision errors in a setting of 
scientific uncertainty, see Lars Koch & Nicholas A. Ashford, Rethinking the Role of Information 
in Chemicals Policy: Implications for TSCA and REACH, 14 J. CLEANER PROD. 31, 34 (2006). 
89. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 12-13. 
90. See REACH art. 57 (substances subject to authorization); see also REACH IN BRIEF, 
supra note 15, at 16 (explaining that chemicals of very high concern include "[c]arcinogenic, 
mutagenic, or reprotoxic substances"). 
91. REACH, art. 58(1)(c). 
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chemicals is itself a major achievement in the field of chemical 
regulation, and the European Commission anticipates that 
approximately 1,400 of the 30,000 substances (5 percent) that will be 
registered under REACH will be subject to such authorization.92 
This shift in the burden of proof does not mean that all VHC 
chemicals will be withdrawn from the market. Instead, regulators may 
grant a time-limited authorization to continue to market a VHC 
chemical if the manufacturer or importer can demonstrate that the 
risks to human health and the environment are "adequately 
controlled,"93 or if this showing cannot be made, 94 the proponent must 
demonstrate: (1) that the socioeconomic benefits exceed the risks, and 
(2) that there are no suitable substitute chemicals or technologies.95 
This carefully crafted text both shifts the burden of proof to 
industry and brings cost-benefit analysis and product substitution into 
the heart of the legislation. REACH is premised on the idea that 
chemicals can simultaneously pose risks to human health and be 
beneficial to human welfare in a wide variety of commercial products. 
REACH therefore bifurcates regulatory action by: (1) identifying 
substances of "very high concern," based on hazardous characteristics, 
and imposing a presumption that VHC chemicals should not be 
marketed; and (2) bringing exposure, risk, and socioeconomic concerns 
into the regulatory discussion in the authorization stage, by giving 
manufacturers an opportunity to overcome the presumption against 
continued marketing. The legislation is an example of how 
precautionary environmental legislation need not exclude cost-benefit 
analysis, but instead can incorporate it into an overall regulatory 
structure that still gives primacy to public health protection. 
92. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 16. Industry groups have criticized REACH on the 
grounds that it lacks priority-setting mechanisms, given that industry must spend substantial 
resources on registration of thousands of chemicals, when only a small portion of these chemicals 
will ultimately be deemed "very high concern" under REACH. See Harvey Black, Chemical 
Reaction: The U.S. Response to REACH, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 125, Al26 (2008). But 
comprehensive identification of hazard and exposure data in the registration process, far from 
being a drawback of the legislation, should be seen as an advantage. It means that risk 
assessments will be based on full, rather than fragmentary, information, and that substances 
will not presumptively be deemed safe without submission of the test data and exposure 
information to back up that claim. 
93. REACH art. 60(2). 
94. REACH presumes that risks cannot be adequately controlled for persistent and 
bioaccumulative chemicals and for chemicals that do not have a known safe threshold below 
which a lack of adverse effects can be documented. Id. art. 60(3). 
95. ld. art. 60(4). 
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3. Improved Risk Communication 
The third major innovation of REACH is its requirement of 
bidirectional risk communication. REACH requires that chemical 
manufacturers identify businesses that are downstream users of their 
products-from cosmetics and candy makers to furniture makers, 
farmers, and textile companies. Chemical manufacturers must 
communicate to these downstream users, through a safety data sheet 
accompanying chemical shipments, the known risks of each chemical 
and recommended risk management techniques.96 Downstream users, 
in turn, must inform upstream suppliers of any new hazards they 
discover from a chemical, as well as any indication that the risk 
management instructions they received are inadequate.97 Downstream 
users must also ensure that their specific use of a chemical was 
covered in the registration package submitted by the manufacturer, or 
they must prepare a new chemical safety report for any unanticipated 
uses. 98 
REACH thereby makes data on toxicity and risk management 
a.vailable up and down the supply chain, helping to overcome one of 
the primary barriers to effective chemical regulation: a lack of 
understanding of the actual uses and exposures to chemicals within 
the chain of commerce.99 TSCA, in contrast, does not create a 
comprehensive system for tracking material flows and exposures 
throughout the chain of distribution, and it imposes no responsibility 
on downstream users to document how chemicals are used or how 
exposures may be occurring.wo 
REACH also emphasizes public disclosure and right-to-know to 
a greater extent than TSCA.l01 The legislation establishes an Internet 
registry of chemical data, which includes information about physical 
96. Id. arts. 31-32. 
97. ld. art. 37; see also KEN GEISER & JOEL TICKNER, LOWELL CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE PROD., 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN CHEMICALS POLICY: DRIVERS, SCOPE, AND STATUS 1, 143 (2003), 
available at http://www.chemicalspolicy.org/downloads/newdirectionsfinal.pdf ("As chemical 
manufacturers and importers have responsibility to assess risks, there is an incentive for them 
to more effectively communicate with downstream users to obtain critical use data and for 
downstream users to ensure that they obtain hazard data from manufacturers."). 
98. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 11. 
99. See id. at 8 (explaining that REACH makes both chemical manufacturers and 
downstream users responsible for the safe handling and use of chemicals). 
100. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 37; see also Tickner, supra note 36, at 
6 (explaining that chemical manufacturers often know very little about the uses of their own 
chemicals more than one or two steps down the supply chain and arguing that "(i]t is virtually 
impossible to manage chemicals without this knowledge"). 
101. For more information on the right-to-know provisions of REACH, see Applegate, 
Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 3, at 750-51. 
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properties and toxicity and will be accessible to both EU regulators 
and the public. 102 It contains narrower protections for confidential 
business information than TSCA.1°3 In a critical right-to-know reform, 
REACH provides that suppliers of any product in Europe that 
contains a VHC chemical must alert the recipient of the product (such 
as a retailer) to the presence of the chemical and provide information 
on safe use.l04 Suppliers must also provide the same information to 
consumers, upon request. 105 These disclosures will help spotlight, for 
the first time, the presence of hazardous substances in a wide variety 
of consumer products sold in Europe (and elsewhere), such as toys, 
furniture, clothing, autos, and electronics. 
As a package, the risk communication measures of REACH will 
help promote the emerging global field of "green chemistry"106-an 
approach to chemical manufacture and product design that minimizes 
toxic risks-by making safety information broadly available to the 
chemical marketplace. In the United States, firms that want to green 
their supply chain are often unable to make comparative choices about 
the safest chemicals for their needs because of the longstanding data 
drought on chemical toxicity.l07 Moreover, customers, investors, 
lenders, and other stakeholders cannot judge whether a firm is 
making sound choices between conventional chemicals and safer 
alternatives. The information-forcing devices of REACH, such as "No 
Data, No Market," and the risk communication devices of REACH will 
benefit companies that reduce toxic risks from their products, in 
Europe and potentially in the United States. 
102. See REACH art. 77(2)(e) (mandating that information is to be made publicly available 
over the Internet, except where a specific request for confidentiality is deemed justified). 
103. In a 2007 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted persistent problems 
with overbroad confidentiality claims by the chemical industry under TSCA. Gov'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 26 (noting that challenging confidentiality claims is 
"resource-intensive" for EPA and that many confidentiality claims, when challenged, are found to 
be inappropriate). In contrast, "REACH places substantial restrictions on the types of data that 
chemical companies may claim as confidential." Id. at 27. 
104. REACH art. 33. This requirement is triggered if the product contains any substance 
that is subject to authorization, at greater than 0.1 percent by weight. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Green chemistry refers to designing products and substances in ways that minimize 
chemical risks to human health and the environment. See PAUL ANASTAS & JOHN WARNER, 
GREEN CHEMISTRY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11, 30 (1998) (defining green chemistry and outlining 
its twelve principles, including designing chemical substances that have little or no toxicity and 
using safer solvents and chemicals that degrade into innocuous substances). 
107. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 2 (testimony of Michael P. Wilson) (explaining that in 
California, businesses that use chemicals do not have sufficient data to find the least hazardous 
choices). 
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4. Incentives for Substitution 
The fourth major innovation of REACH is that the legislation 
systematically promotes substitutes for known hazardous substances 
and introduces comparative analysis of the risks of chemicals into the 
regulatory process. According to the preamble, REACH is designed to 
"encourage and in certain cases to ensure that substances of high 
concern are eventually replaced by less dangerous substances or 
technologies where suitable economically and technically viable 
alternatives are available."10S 
REACH promotes substitution through both implicit incentives 
and explicit requirements. Among the implicit incentives for 
substitution are the public disclosure of toxicity information in the 
registration process, the potential market risk from being identified as 
a VHC chemical, and the administrative burden of complying with the 
authorization process for VHC chemicals. 
Substitution analysis is an explicit requirement of the 
authorization process. Under REACH, any applicant for authorization 
of a VHC chemical must include in its application an "analysis of 
alternatives considering their risks and the technical and economic 
feasibility of substitution."109 Where this analysis shows that suitable 
alternative chemicals are available, the applicant must prepare a 
formal substitution plan, including a timetable.l10 In reviewing these 
applications, the European Commission can consider a variety of 
factors in determining whether safer substitutes are indeed feasible, 
and it must determine whether the substitutes "would result in 
reduced overall risks to human health or the environment."111 To limit 
the possibility that applicants will cursorily conclude that their own 
product has no viable substitute, third parties are entitled to present 
information on substitutes to the Commission.112 
A systematic comparison of the risks of alternative chemicals 
has never been a prominent part of the TSCA regulatory scheme. 
Chemical substitution is mentioned only once in TSCA, in Section 6, 
which requires that regulators identify substitutes along with the 
108. REACH pmbl. ~ 12; see also REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 8 (stating that one 
objective of REACH is to "encourage the substitution of dangerous by less dangerous substances 
where suitable alternatives are available .... The increased accountability of downstream users 
and better public information will create a strong demand for substitute chemicals that have 
been sufficiently tested and that are safe for the envisaged use."). 
109. REACH art. 62(4)(e). 
110. Id. art. 62(4)(f). 
111. Id. art. 60(5)(a). 
112. Id. art. 64(2). 
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economic benefits of any chemical they are considering restricting.ll3 
As noted above, however, the restrictions process of Section 6 has been 
invoked only five times in the history of TSCA. 114 Moreover, in this 
regulatory context, the requirement that the government identify 
whether safer substitute chemicals exist serves as one more hurdle for 
regulators considering chemical restrictions. TSCA does not promote a 
broader, ongoing search for safer alternatives as a routine part of U.S. 
chemical policy. 
C. REACH Implementation and Cost Issues 
REACH's text establishes an aggressive new approach to 
research, disclosure, and management of toxic risks, yet REACH's 
ultimate efficacy will depend on the EU's handling of a complex set of 
implementation challenges. These challenges include reviewing tens of 
thousands of chemical registrations; establishing the authority and 
competence of the brand-new European Chemicals Agency, which 
opened its doors in June 2008; coordinating research, enforcement, 
and regulatory decisionmaking across twenty-seven Member States; 
evaluating thousands of chemicals for hazardous properties; and 
overseeing an authorization system that is bound to lead to disputes 
with manufacturers. Industry groups have charged that REACH will 
lead to chemicals being withdrawn from the European market because 
small enterprises will find that the burdens of testing outweigh their 
profit from low-volume substances.l15 They contend that supply-chain 
disruptions could result and that European manufacturers who rely 
on such chemicals will need to find substitutes quickly. These 
implementation challenges are formidable. However, it is not unusual 
on either side of the Atlantic for implementation of a regulatory 
regime of this magnitude to be complex, lengthy, and subject to many 
uncertainties. Effective REACH implementation needs to remain a 
priority of the European Commission and the Member States. 
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(l) (2009) (requiring the Administrator to publish a statement 
along with any rule restricting a chemical, which must include, among other things, the benefits 
of the restricted chemical, the availability of substitute chemicals, and "the reasonably 
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule .... "). 
114. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 18. 
115. Royal Society of Chemistry, REACH: The RSC Response, http://www.rsc.org/Science 
AndTechnology/Policy/Bulletinsllssue1/REACH.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) ("There is concern 
that REACH could lead to useful chemicals being withdrawn unnecessarily due to the high cost 
of testing, rather than for health, safety or environmental reasons."). But see ACKERMAN & 
MAsSEY, supra note 72, at 10 (arguing that if a chemical essential to downstream users is 
withdrawn from the market because its manufacturer believes it is not worth paying the costs of 
REACH compliance, then the chemical is probably underpriced). 
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Are REACH's public health protections worth the cost? 
Estimates for REACH compliance costs vary widely. The European 
Commission estimated the total cost to industry for testing and 
registration under REACH at €2.3 billion over the eleven-year phase-
in period of the legislation.l16 The Global Development and 
Environment Institute at Tufts University calculated that REACH 
implementation will cost the chemical industry €3.46 billion over 
eleven years, or €315 million per year.l17 Industry-financed studies, on 
the other hand, have calculated direct costs of up to €13 billion over 
eleven years, 118 and there is wide variation in estimates for indirect 
costs, such as potential price increases for downstream users or 
potential unavailability of some chemical inputs. 119 As for the impact 
on the United States, the American Chemistry Council has estimated 
that REACH compliance will cost U.S. companies approximately $400 
million over eleven years.12o 
While these costs for industry are not insignificant, they are 
also not exceptional for the launch of a major new environmental 
program-a program designed to reverse three decades of inadequate, 
lax regulation of the chemical marketplace. REACH compliance costs 
should drop off dramatically after the initial phase-in period, when 
companies will have conducted all the required testing and submitted 
the registrations for chemicals now manufactured in or imported into 
Europe. Moreover, annual revenues of the European chemical 
industry are over €500 billion, so even if REACH compliance costs 
turn out to be €1 billion per year, near the high range of estimates, 
such costs would represent only 0.2 percent of annual industry 
revenues. This is a small price to pay for achieving a more complete 
understanding of chemical risks, reducing cancers and birth defects, 
and saving-according to the estimate of the European Commission-
4,500 lives each year from occupational exposures to hazardous 
chemicals. 121 
116. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 15, at 11. 
117. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, supra note 72, at 33. 
118. Id. at 43. 
119. For an extensive discussion of the various cost-benefit analyses prepared when REACH 
was under discussion in the EU, see GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 113-18. 
120. Id. at 139. 
121. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, supra note 72, at 51. Only a few studies have attempted to 
monetize the public health and environmental benefits of REACH. The European Commission 
monetized the benefits of reduced disease and death from occupational exposures to harmful 
chemicals at €50 billion over thirty years, using a figure for the value of each life saved that is 
lower than figures generally used in the United States. Id. Another study by the World Wildlife 
Fund-UK concluded that the benefits of REACH from reduced disease, mortality, and reduced 
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II. THE TRANSNATIONAL REACH OF REACH 
REACH and TSCA are two contrasting regulatory regimes, 
both of which govern information generation and disclosure in a 
highly globalized industry. Given that the annual chemical trade 
between the United States and the EU is more than $70 billion,122 
REACH is bound to cause transnational externalities in the U.S. 
market. What are these likely impacts? How will they occur? Will the 
reaction to REACH in the United States be backlash and opposition, 
emulation, or something else? 
In this Part, I argue that the implementation of REACH in 
Europe increases the probability that the United States will reform its 
own system of chemical regulation by coordinating with, or emulating 
the major principles of, the European model. The enactment of 
REACH in 2006 may ultimately be seen as the birth of a new global 
standard, with EU regulatory norms spreading to the United States 
and other major jurisdictions. TSCA reform is not inevitable, however, 
and the politics of chemical regulation reform in the United States are 
very much in flux. Even if TSCA reform does not occur, the 
transnational reach of REACH will nonetheless improve public health 
protections in the United State by providing toxicity data to national. 
and subnational regulators and promoting beneficial changes in the 
U.S. chemical marketplace. 
The analysis in this Part is grounded in transnational 
regulatory theory. It shows how legal norms, initially embodied in 
domestic legislation in one jurisdiction, can be transplanted 
horizontally to other jurisdictions. This Part explores the mechanisms 
for this transmission of legal norms and argues that information 
disclosure legislation such as REACH is becoming an important 
vehicle for the horizontal spread oflegal norms in environmental law. 
A. Regulatory Turbulence 
Just as one country's discharge of pollution can result in 
transnational externalities, one country's regulatory response to 
environmental risks can also result in transnational externalities by 
imposing costs on foreign firms, limiting or expanding political options 
productivity loss from chemical exposures will be €57 billion to €283 billion over twenty years. 
Id. at 52. 
122. See Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Trade Facts: Transatlantic Trade, http://www. 
tabd.cornlindex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&1temid=48 (last visited Oct. 8, 
2009) ("Imports of chemicals by the United States from the European Union rose ... to almost 
$78 billion in 2007."). 
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in foreign jurisdictions, changing foreign investment flows, and 
shaping foreign regulatory debates. 
I refer to these transnational externalities from the enactment 
of internal legislation as "regulatory turbulence." Regulatory 
turbulence is usually an unintended byproduct of one jurisdiction's 
regulatory decisions. However, national regulators may also attempt 
to enhance their own prestige and national power through intentional, 
even coercive, efforts to spread their domestic innovations to other 
jurisdictions.123 
Regulatory turbulence is antecedent to processes of legal 
transplant or legal export that have been much analyzed in political 
science literature.124 Transplant and export refer to the adoption by 
one jurisdiction of legislative, regulatory, or judicial innovations of 
another jurisdiction.125 Regulatory turbulence, in contrast, occurs 
before political actors have made a decision to adopt formally a foreign 
legal innovation. Regulatory turbulence is best described as a "legal 
irritant,"126 as it can trigger unexpected economic, political, and 
cultural ripple effects in numerous jurisdictions-effects that may or 
may not be reflected, ultimately, in national legislation. 
Regulatory turbulence is particularly pronounced when a 
jurisdiction imposes environmental standards for products traded in 
global commerce, as in the case of REACH. When a large jurisdiction 
enacts a product standard (such as a recycled content standard, an 
energy efficiency standard, or a design or labeling standard), 
multinational firms will have to meet that standard or risk losing that 
market. In contrast, enactment of domestic process standards, such as 
emissions limits for factories, power plants, and other sources of 
123. See, e.g., David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order: The International 
System as an Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 52, 64 (2005) 
("Mery often policy makers have an interest in the dissemination of policies, either because of 
motivations around the beliefs of what is for the greater global good or because there is some 
benefit to the adoption by other jurisdictions of the policy maker's innovation."). 
124. See Dobbin et al., supra note 12, at 450 (reviewing and distinguishing four theories 
explaining diffusion of policies across nations); David Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from 
Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, 13 GOVERNANCE: INT'L J. 
Poc'y & ADMIN. 5, 506 (2000) (analyzing the relationship between voluntary and forced policy 
transfer); Lazer, supra note 12, at 475 (highlighting three modes of regulatory interdependence 
and applying them to the regulation of fish inspection); Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal 
Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant 
Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 839 (2003). 
125. See Miller, supra note 124, at 839 (defining legal transplant as "the movement of laws 
and legal institutions between states"). 
126. See David Levi-Faur & Jacint Jordana, Regulatory Capitalism: Policy Irritants and 
Convergent Divergence, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 191, 192-93 (2005) ("[W]hen a 
foreign rule is imposed .... [i]t is not transplanted into another organism, rather it works as 
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events."). 
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pollution, is far less likely to cause regulatory turbulence in other 
jurisdictions.127 Process standards, by their very nature, apply to 
stationary facilities within the territory of the sovereign that enacts 
them, whereas product standards have the potential to affect 
commercial relationships, design decisions, and profitability of firms 
around the world. 12s 
REACH is a powerful engine of regulatory turbulence in the 
United States and in other jurisdictions because it acts as both a 
product standard, governing access to the most lucrative chemical 
market in the world, and as an information disclosure statute. 
Through its information generation and disclosure provisions, REACH 
will create a body of toxicity data that will be accessible to any other 
chemical regulatory authority in the world. REACH, therefore, is 
likely to have significant extraterritorial impact on U.S. firms and 
regulatory activity outside of Europe.129 
Although REACH has been in force since only June 2007, signs 
of its regulatory turbulence may already be seen in the United States. 
REACH is easily the biggest regulatory change for the U.S. chemical 
industry in a generation-indeed, since TSCA's enactment. Most 
significantly, REACH has changed the legal terrain for U.S. firms that 
do business in Europe. Major U.S. chemical manufacturers such as 
Dow and DuPont are now conducting toxicity testing under REACH 
guidelines as part of the registration process for their products sold in 
Europe_l3° In the wake of REACH's enactment, American firms are 
developing EU-compliant toxicity data to avoid "toxic lock-out" for 
127. EU legislation on emissions controls for cement kilns, for example, would be unlikely to 
affect the cement industry outside the EU. The reach of the legislation would be limited to 
cement kilns located within the political boundaries of the EU. 
128. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 
102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2043-45 (1993) (distinguishing between process standards and product 
standards and concluding that "the common interest in harmonizing process standards is 
typically weaker than the common interest in harmonizing product standards, where 
harmonization can increase the economic welfare of all nations by removing trade barriers"). 
129. Two-way trade (exports and imports) between the United States and the European 
Union exceeded $600 billion in 2007, which was almost twice as high as U.S.-China trade and 
nearly three times as high as U.S.-Japan trade. See Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Trade 
Facts: Transatlantic Trade, http://www.tabd.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 
19&1temid=48 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) (noting that chemical exports from the United States to 
the European Union grew by 66 percent from 2003 to 2007). 
130. Dow created twenty-three research teams to gather the chemical toxicity data needed 
for REACH's pre-registration deadline of December 1, 2008. Sara Goodman, New European 
Disclosure Law Shifts 'Burden of Proof' to Industry, GREENWIRE, June 23, 2008, 
http://www.eenews.net/gw. REACH also applies to any product that contains chemicals intended 
for release during normal or foreseeable use (such as air fresheners or ink-jet printer cartridges), 
REACH art. 7.1(b), so the legislation affects many large U.S. consumer product manufacturers 
selling in Europe, such as Procter & Gamble and Hewlett Packard. 
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their products in Europe, 131 and a cottage industry of REACH 
consultants has emerged to guide American firms and their European 
subsidiaries through the REACH process.132 
B. Three National Responses to Regulatory Turbulence 
It is too facile to conclude that because one jurisdiction enacts 
stringent domestic environmental legislation, trading partners will 
inevitably follow with their own copycat legislation in a process of 
upward harmonization. Regulatory turbulence may, in some cases, 
lead to a transplant of regulatory innovations across jurisdictional 
lines, and numerous countries may ultimately adopt a version of a 
single influential regulatory model. But turbulence need not lead to 
this result in all circumstances. Instead, regulatory turbulence in 
environmental law can result in three distinct paths of transnational 
regulatory interactions. 
1. The Conflict Path 
Transnational conflict is one possible response to regulatory 
turbulence. State A, for example, may challenge State B's internal 
environmental lawmaking as an unfair barrier to trade that 
disadvantages State A's exporters. State A, the aggrieved jurisdiction, 
may request diplomatic resolution, retaliate with its own trade 
measures, or file a formal complaint with an international body such 
as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Such challenges are 
frequent in the case of product standards, where a trading partner 
may allege that one jurisdiction's standards constitute a prohibited 
non-tariff barrier to trade. In the transatlantic context, the most 
prominent examples of such conflicts have been the disputes over the 
European ban on beef hormones and the European moratorium on the 
import and production of genetically modified foods. In both cases, the 
EU's internal regulatory policy, enacted ostensibly for public health 
reasons, had substantial extraterritorial effects. It served to exclude 
non-compliant American products from the European market, creating 
131. NINJA REINEKE, HOW IS THE US RESPONDING TO NEW EUROPEAN CHEMICALS LAW? THE 
IMPACT OF EUROPE'S REACH DEBATE ON CHEMICALS POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE US 10 (Feb. 
2008), available at http:// assets. panda.org/downloadslhow _is_the_us_responding_to 
_the_new_european_chemicals_law.pdf (explaining that "toxic lock out" occurs when products are 
denied access to a market because of their toxic content or their non-compliance with 
environmental regulations). 
132. See, e.g., ChemSafe, Consulting Services for Chemical Industry, http://www.chemsafe-
consulting.com/reach/consulting_firm.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
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intense trade friction and legal and political acrimony. In both cases, 
the WTO ruled in favor of the United States.l33 
The United States and the EU have clashed in a number of 
other areas at the intersection of environmental protection and 
transatlantic trade.l34 David Wirth has referred to these trade-and-
environment disputes as examples of "negative harmonization."135 
These disputes are attempts to resolve the legal friction from 
divergent product standards by compelling one jurisdiction to modify 
or repeal its (usually more stringent) standard.l36 
2. The Coordination Path 
Regulatory turbulence can also stimulate a process of 
coordination, in which trading partners seek to harmonize national 
standards across borders. Coordination of national policies, 
particularly with respect to product standards, both reduces trade 
barriers and provides economies of scale, as it allows firms to produce 
a single product that complies with the national requirements of 
numerous jurisdictions. 
Coordination of national regulatory policies may occur through 
several mechanisms. It might occur through a straightforward process 
of learning, modeling, and sharing of ideas. A state might adopt a 
legislative program similar to one enacted by another state because 
that legislation appears to be an attractive "off-the-shelf' model that 
has proven workable in another jurisdiction. For example, numerous 
countries now have some form of environmental impact review 
legislation for major government actions, an innovation pioneered in 
the United States through the National Environmental Policy Act of 
133. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products, ~ 6, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (ruling that the European 
Community's measure was inconsistent with WTO law); Panel Report, European Communities-
Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 1, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (ruling that parts of the European Community's 
regulatory regime for the approval and marketing of biotech products violated the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures). 
134. In January 2009, for example, the United States filed a complaint with the WTO 
challenging an EU ban on U.S. poultry treated with pathogen reduction chemicals. Press 
Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Challenging EU 
Restrictions on U.S. Poultry Exports (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2009/january/us-files-wto-case-challenging-eu-restrictions-us-p. 
135. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 94 (finding that "structured negative harmonization" results 
in "relaxation of the rigor of regulatory standards"). 
136. According to Wirth, the task of trade law is "to distinguish between those unilateral 
measures ostensibly intended to promote environmental, consumer protection, or public health 
goals that are legitimate exercises of governmental regulatory powers and those that are, by 
contrast, pretexts for protectionism." Id. at 95. 
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1969.137 Argentina's hazardous waste law is a virtual copy of U.S. 
legislation.l38 And, as noted in Part I, the EU's chemical regulatory 
regime prior to REACH was closely modeled on TSCA. 
Coordination can also be stimulated through what Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has called "transgovernmentalism," or the regularized 
interactions of national regulatory officials operating in loose 
transnational networks. 139 Within these networks, officials spread 
information on best practices, highlight opportunities for welfare-
enhancing harmonization, and build capacity to enforce and 
implement regulations. 140 The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, for example, has been active since the 
early 1980s in promoting voluntary harmonization of national policies 
on chemical labeling and mutual acceptance of test data. 141 
Pressure from private firms can provide yet another stimulus 
for the coordination path. This mechanism of coordination, which can 
unfold even without the purposive interactions of national 
bureaucrats, often occurs in two steps. First, if a large jurisdiction 
enacts an environmental standard for products, firms will have to 
comply with that standard or risk losing access to a major customer 
137. See Tseming Yang & Robert Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law 10-
12 (Vt. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-09, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1269157 (describing the 
environmental impact assessment procedures adopted by various nations). 
138. Miller, supra note 124, at 846. 
139. Slaughter has defined "transgovernmental networks" as "pattern[s] of regular and 
purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide 
countries from one another and that demarcate the 'domestic' from the 'international' sphere." 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 14 (2004). Similarly, Kal Raustiala has defined 
transgovernmental networks as "loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent 
interaction rather than formal negotiation." Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 1, 5 (2002). Examples of these networks include the International Organization of Securities 
Commissioners, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the International 
Maritime Organization, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. See 
id. at 18 (explaining the "power-shift" from the state to nongovernmental organizations). For a 
detailed discussion on the role of the OECD in generating transnational legal norms, see James 
Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 220-21 (2005). 
140. See Raustiala, supra note 139, at 52-53; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government 
Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 
1057 (2003) (arguing that although transgovernmental networks rarely make binding rules, the 
information-exchange function of policy networks is invaluable to domestic regulators looking for 
guidance on best practices). 
141. Wirth, supra note 9, at 93. Wirth notes that the OECD has had less success in 
coordinating national policies on a minimum set of pre-market data for new chemicals. An OECD 
effort to establish such a minimum data set in the early 1980s failed when the United States did 
not accept the plan, largely because the proposal exceeded the requirements of TSCA and other 
domestic legislation. Id. at 99. 
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base. They may find it impractical to produce alternative versions for 
other markets and may therefore choose to produce a single product 
that conforms to the standards of the strictest jurisdiction.142 In this 
process, one jurisdiction's domestic law becomes the de facto global 
norm governing the industry. 
In the second step of coordination through pressure from 
private firms, governments may conform their legislation to 
approximate the law of the strict originating jurisdiction, either to 
avoid trade disruption or because they find it relatively costless to do 
so, since major domestic firms are already complying with the foreign 
standard. 143 Firms operating in multiple jurisdictions may also lobby 
for coordination of national policies at the level of the most stringent 
jurisdiction to avoid being placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-
vis domestic competitors. 144 The end result of these processes is 
upward pressure on national regulatory standards, outside of the 
originating jurisdiction. 
In this mechanism of coordination, the marketplace itself acts 
as the "transmission belt" for the legal norms of the originating 
jurisdiction.145 This process has been dubbed the "California effect," 
after the U.S. state that has often played this first-mover role in 
American environmentallaw. 146 It has also been called a "race to the 
top" or "race to the hegemon" because regulatory activity by a major 
power exerts a gravitational pull on other powers to enact conforming 
domestic standards. 147 For the originating jurisdiction, transforming 
142. See Per·Olof Busch, Helge Jorgens & Kerstin Tews, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory 
Instruments: The Making of a New International Environmental Regime, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & Soc. Sci. 146, 152 (2005) (discussing the result of economic competition as a "'race to the 
top' whereby countries seek to emulate new and ambitious regulatory approaches ... and not lag 
behind other countries"); see also Jacob Park, Unbundling Globalization: Agent of Policy 
Convergence?, 4 INT'L STUD. REV. 230, 232 (2002) ("[l]t is frequently overlooked that it is more 
expensive for MNCs [multinational corporations] to maintain different regulatory standards 
than to maintain one global standard and to upgrade the environmental standards of the laggard 
facilities."). 
143. See Lazer, supra note 12, at 477 (noting the incentive for jurisdictions to adhere to 
standards that are compatible with other jurisdictions). 
144. See ELIZABETH DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY: INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER 5-7 (2000) (describing the 
"phenomenon of internationalization of environmental policies"). 
145. See Yang & Percival, supra note 137, at 7 ("[R]egulatory innovations spread not only 
through the work of government regulators but also through the responses of the regulated 
communities."). 
146. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 5-8 (1995); Wirth, supra note 9, at 96-97 (discussing California effect). 
147. See VOGEL, supra note 146, at 6. Vogel argues that the race to the top can occur under 
two conditions: (1) where domestic firms align themselves with environmental groups to push for 
strict domestic environmental standards to keep out foreign competition (a so-called "Baptist-
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domestic product standards into global standards undoubtedly 
benefits domestic firms, which may have made early capital 
investments in compliance.l48 Indeed, a nation's ability to gain 
regional or global acquiescence to its own regulatory standards is now 
seen as a key element of national "soft power."149 
The EU's enactment in 2003 of a directive on electronics 
provides one recent example of the coordination path.150 That 
directive, on Restriction of Hazardous Substances ("RoHS"), banned 
six toxic substances from most electronics sold in Europe. 151 Due to the 
size of the EU market, the legislation had the effect of shifting the 
design and manufacture of electronic products globally. Electronics 
manufacturers in China, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan quickly changed 
product designs and eliminated the six toxic substances to maintain 
their access to the EU market. 152 Once manufacturers shifted their 
product designs to be "RoHS-compliant," other jurisdictions enacted 
legislation similar to the EU model. China, for instance, adopted 
legislation in 2005 (colloquially known as "China RoHS") that banned 
the same six substances in most electronics sold in China. 153 
California also adopted a version of RoHS in 2005, banning the same 
six substances in covered electronics sold in California. In an example 
bootlegger" coalition), and (2) where multinational corporations selling in many national markets 
push for harmonized national standards to achieve economies of scale and reduce barriers to 
global distribution. Id. at 7-8, 20. 
148. As Kal Raustiala explained, jurisdictions actively promote adoption of their standards 
abroad because they "reap the gains of convergence around their preferred outcome." Raustiala, 
supra note 139, at 68. 
149. See JOSEPHS. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at x 
(2004) (defining soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments"). 
150. Another example of a "California effect" in environmental regulation is the global 
spread of rules mandating double hulls for oil tankers. Such rules were enacted in multiple 
jurisdictions after the United States mandated double hulls for most tankers in its territorial 
waters, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 46 U.S.C. § 3703a(a) 
(2009); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN AsSESSMENT OF 
THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 1 (1998) (noting that the Oil Pollution Act, and the subsequent 
adoption of a double-hull requirement in international maritime law, has led to double-hull 
tankers becoming the "industry standard"). 
151. Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 
2003 on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment, 2003 O.J. (L 37) 19. 
152. See Rob Spiegel, Is Asia Ready for RoHS?, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2006, available at 
http://www.edn.com/article/CA6313998.html (outlining Asia's ability to meet the EU's RoHS 
directive). 
153. See, e.g., Suzanne Deffree, China RoHS: Ready or Not, It's Here, ELECTRONIC NEWS, 
Mar. 12, 2007, at 2; Tam Harbert, China Flexes Environmental Muscles, ELECTRONIC BUSINESS, 
Sept. 1, 2006, at 34 (outlining China's regulation of lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent 
chromium, polybrominated biphenyl, and polybrominated diphenyl ether). 
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of how close the coordinative response can be, the California 
legislation provided that if the EU added to its list of six hazardous 
substances, those additional substances would automatically be 
banned in covered electronics sold in California. 154 
3. The Stasis Path 
The third possible path of interaction among domestic 
regulatory regimes is stasis. In this path, countries choose to "go their 
own way," maintaining divergent environmental standards for 
globally traded products, despite regulatory turbulence and probable 
interjurisdictional trade disruption. 
Stasis is a frequent response to regulatory turbulence for 
several reasons: states may not be paying close attention to the 
domestic regulatory standards of their trading partners, the 
transaction costs to coordinate regulatory policy may be too high, or 
states may simply decide that the environmental standards of a 
foreign power would be welfare-reducing if adopted domestically. 
States may also seek competitive advantage by maintaining lax 
environmental standards if other jurisdictions are moving toward 
stringency. 155 
From a public choice perspective, even if certain bureaucratic 
elites see advantages in transnational coordination of regulatory 
policy (whether in the environmental field or in other policy areas 
such as banking, securities, or aviation), countervailing pressures, 
such as dissenting interest groups or political parties, may prevail in 
the domestic political process. Various lock-in effects and path 
dependency may also make it too costly to reform existing legislation 
to harmonize it with the legislation of a foreign jurisdiction. The cost 
of harmonizing regulatory policies across borders might range from 
near-zero (if jurisdictions have no preexisting regulatory path in a 
given issue area) to potentially billions of dollars (if jurisdictions have 
already made significant investments in' a divergent regulatory 
apparatus). 156 
154. Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 25214.10(b) (West 2006); see also Noah Sachs, Planning the 
Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in the European Union and the United 
States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 93-94 (2006) (discussing the transnational effects of the 
EU's RoHS directive). 
155. See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining 
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 
67, 88-89 (1996) (describing this inter-jurisdictional "race to the bottom"). 
156. Raustiala, supra note 139, at 67-68; see also DREZNER, supra note 12, at 5 ("Whether 
regulatory coordination takes place is a function of the adjustment costs actors face in altering 
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One prominent example of jurisdictions choosing divergent 
regulatory systems for a highly globalized industry, despite regulatory 
turbulence and potential trade disruption, is the continuance of 
divergent cell phone standards between the United States and 
Europe. The United States and the EU also maintain divergent 
emissions limits and fuel economy standards for automobiles, different 
standards for pesticide residues on food, and different regulatory 
systems for cosmetics. Multinational firms must adapt to these 
divergent standards and, in many cases, produce different products for 
different markets. 
4. Transnational Regulatory Interactions and Globalization 
Much of the literature on transnational regulatory interactions 
suggests that given the economic interdependence of globalization, 
transnational convergence around certain values, policies, or outcomes 
is somehow mechanistic or inevitable-especially in industrialized 
nations.l57 But as the above discussion illustrates, the coordination 
path is not predestined, and domestic regulatory policies frequently 
diverge even among close trading partners. As nations and economies 
become more interdependent, a pastiche of complex regulatory 
interactions emerges, resulting in conflict, coordination, and stasis. 
Despite predictions from many analysts that globalization would erode 
the power of the state vis-a-vis private capital,158 states continue to 
enjoy considerable autonomy to regulate private markets within their 
borders; coordination is just one possible response to regulatory 
turbulence from foreign jurisdictions. 
When transnational regulatory coordination does occur, it is 
important to question whether such coordination is normatively 
beneficial for economies, society, or the environment. Here again 
generalization is difficult, and the answer must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. Regulatory coordination might lead to the rapid 
their preexisting rules and regulations. When the adjustment costs are sufficiently high, not 
even globalization's powerful dynamics can push states into cooperating."). 
157. See Colin Bennet, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 
215, 216 (1991) (critiquing the argument that industrialization sets in motion "certain 
deterministic processes ... which tend over time to shape social structures, political processes, 
and public policies in the same mould"); Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy 
Convergence, 3 INT'L STUD. REV. 53, 53 (2001) ("An implicit assumption of most policy analysts 
and some academics is that globalization leads to a convergence of traditionally national policies 
governing environmental regulation, consumer health and safety, the regulation of labor, and 
the ability to tax capital."). 
158. See DREZNER, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing literature on the decline of the state in the 
era of globalization). 
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spread of valuable innovation in environmental law, without the 
laborious process of negotiating multilateral environmental treaties. 
On the other hand, pressure to conform national legislation to that of 
a major power might have deleterious effects. Such conformity 
pressure might cut off policy innovation or experimentation, for 
example, or it might lead to anticompetitive trade practices. 
Given the complexities of transnational regulatory interactions, 
this Article does not articulate an overarching theory, applicable 
across all industries and all countries, that explains when regulatory 
turbulence will lead to the conflict path rather than the coordination 
or stasis paths. The outcome of transnational regulatory interactions 
depends critically on the relative strength of interest groups, the cost 
structures of the affected industries, the market power of the 
originating jurisdiction, the closeness of political and economic ties 
among jurisdictions, and a host of other factors. As one scholar 
concluded, there are simply "too many important microdifferences 
among industrial sectors to allow for any broad macroconclusions on 
policy convergence."159 My conclusions in this Article are therefore 
directed solely at U.S.-EU interactions on chemical policy, and not at a 
much broader range of regulatory interactions in other issue areas. In 
this one sector, the potential that REACH will raise global standards 
for chemical testing and management should be seen as a welcome 
extraterritorial benefit of the EU's regulatory decisions. 
C. Information Disclosure and Regulatory Turbulence 
In the Internet age, the disclosure of environmental data needs 
to be seen as a new vehicle for causing regulatory turbulence in other 
jurisdictions, distinct from the extraterritorial impacts of enacting 
product standards. REACH is just one example of environmental 
legislation with a significant information disclosure component. Other 
forms of information disclosure legislation require regulated entities 
to disclose product ingredients, associated health and environmental 
risks, or amounts and types of pollution released from facilities. 
Environmentally relevant information, once disclosed, is usually 
accessible to foreign political actors, who may rely on that information 
in developing new regulations or legislation, bringing enforcement 
actions, or setting policy. 160 
159. Park, supra note 142, at 231. 
160. Legislation that tightens information flows can have similar extraterritorial effects. 
Gregory Shaffer has demonstrated, for example, that an EU data privacy directive enacted in 
1998, which authorized the European Commission to ban data transfers from the EU to 
countries that do not ensure "an adequate level of protection" for data privacy, had the effect of 
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In other fields of law, these kinds of transnational, 
informational ripple effects are so commonplace that we take them for 
granted. Adverse corporate information disclosed under a Chinese 
securities regulation can immediately affect share prices on exchanges 
in New York or London. Evidence of consumer fraud unearthed in one 
jurisdiction can be used to bring copycat fraud claims against the 
same corporation in other jurisdictions. 
Yet despite the explosive growth of information disclosure rules 
as a tool for environmental protection, existing scholarship has rarely 
focused on the role of information disclosure legislation as a vehicle for 
the transmission of environmental law norms. 
How, specifically, does information disclosure m one 
jurisdiction affect the regulatory systems of other jurisdictions? 
According to the political scientist David Lazer-one of the few 
scholars to examme information disclosure and transnational 
regulatory interactions161-nations are linked through an 
"informational mode" of interdependence. 162 Lazer posits that a 
jurisdiction's regulatory activity can convey informational signals to 
other jurisdictions in three stages: policy deliberations, policy choices, 
and policy experiences. 163 First, an originating jurisdiction may make 
available the information that fed its deliberations about whether to 
adopt a certain policy (e.g., scientific research used in the policy 
deliberations).164 Second, an originating jurisdiction conveys a 
transnational, informational signal when it makes a certain policy 
choice (which in itself might convince other countries to follow).1 65 
Third, an originating jurisdiction conveys ongoing informational 
signals about its post-enactment experience with new legislation or 
regulations.166 In this last category, the key information being 
raising the stringency of data privacy protections globally. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization 
and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. 
Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7-8 (2000). 
161. See David Lazer, Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in 
Regulatory Policymaking, 12 EUR. L.J. 455, 455-56 (2006) [hereinafter Lazer, Global and 
Domestic Governance]; Lazer, supra note 123, at 52; Lazer, supra note 12, at 474 (discussing the 
interdependence of different countries' regulatory policies). 
162. Lazer, supra note 12, at 480-82. 
163. Lazer, Global and Domestic Governance, supra note 161, at 463. 
164. Lazer, supra note 12, at 481 (noting that the initial epidemiological studies on the 
hazards of asbestos were conducted in Britain, and then spurred regulatory action in the United 
States). 
165. See id. at 480 ("To the extent that states have similar policy preferences, this 
information becomes a public good, readily usable by any other states that might consider 
similar regulatory policies."). 
166. See id. at 475 ("The regulatory choices of other states provide signals ... to good policy 
options."). 
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transmitted, according to Lazer, is whether a given policy works and 
achieves an adequate balance of health, environmental protection, and 
cost.167 Through all three types of informational signals, Lazer 
concludes, countries are constantly providing information to each 
other about what desirable policies are.168 Of course, regulatory 
activity of one jurisdiction might also demonstrate to other 
jurisdictions what undesirable policies are. 
Lazer's analysis is useful in highlighting the web of 
informational connections that link nations in their regulatory 
policymaking, yet he overlooks some critical features of transnational 
informational networks. By focusing on national sovereigns' 
interpretation of policy-relevant information coming from other 
jurisdictions, 169 he misses the numerous ways that information from 
abroad may affect political dynamics at the subnational level: among 
firms, consumers, state or provincial governments, and 
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). These subnational actors 
may use information from foreign regulatory systems in domestic 
battles for political influence. They may also rely on foreign sources of 
information in developing new products, political strategies, and in 
the case of state governments, regulatory agendas. 
Lazer also overlooks a fourth category of informational signals 
that is particularly important for understanding the REACH-TSCA 
interaction: raw data on health and environmental risks, produced 
after the enactment of information disclosure legislation in one 
jurisdiction, may have direct transnational effects on regulation in 
other jurisdictions. Information disclosure legislation in Country A, for 
example, might reveal information about a risk that regulators in 
Country B are required by statute to address (or might choose to 
address if they have regulatory discretion). Air emissions data in an 
environmental impact statement prepared in one jurisdiction might be 
used by regulators who are reviewing a similar project in another 
jurisdiction. In this respect, data on environmental or health risks 
from one jurisdiction might "feed" ongoing regulatory processes in 
other jurisdictions. 
This kind of raw data is a fundamentally different type of 
information than the informational signals Lazer explores, which 
concern whether a certain policy, enacted abroad, is desirable. 
167. Id. at 480. 
168. Lazer, supra note 123, at 53. 
169. See id. at 53 (conceptualizing the international system as an informational network in 
which sovereign nations both produce and process information). 
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Transnational flows of raw data on environmental and public health 
hazards are less filtered by culture and politics than transnational 
signals about what desirable policies are. And disclosures of raw data 
may trigger regulatory action under existing statutes in other 
jurisdictions, without a drawn-out process of considering the 
desirability of foreign regulatory models. Whether environmental 
disclosures in one jurisdiction can be incorporated into existing 
regulation in other jurisdictions will depend on the degree of overlap 
in regulatory approaches. It will also depend on the degree to which 
actors abroad are monitoring environmental disclosures made in the 
originating jurisdiction.170 As Harold Koh has explained, the 
horizontal spread of legal norms depends critically on whether there 
are "norm entrepreneurs," such as NGOs, or "norm sponsors," such as 
legislators, who are following foreign developments and are positioned 
to use foreign sources of information in domestic political debates. In 
D. The Impact of REACH on the United States 
With this theoretical background on transnational regulatory 
interactions and informational spillover effects, it is now easier to see 
the mechanisms through which REACH is influencing the United 
States. REACH's transnational effects are magnified because it acts as 
both a product standard and an information disclosure regulation. 
Manufacturers around the globe, seeking to preserve their access to 
the EU chemical market, will compile the required dossiers and 
chemical safety reports on chemicals sold in the EU, most of which 
have never been tested in the United States or elsewhere. Because the 
hazard and risk information that will be disclosed in the EU pertains 
to globally traded products, as opposed to stationary production 
processes in Europe, the information is likely to be relevant to 
purchasers and regulators of those same chemicals in other 
jurisdictions around the globe. 
What path of regulatory interaction between the United States 
and the EU is likely to flow from the regulatory turbulence from 
REACH: conflict, coordination, or stasis? Although REACH has only 
recently been enacted, there are already signs of a shift in 
170. See Lazer, Global and Domestic Governance, supra note 161, at 464-B5 (noting that 
policymakers can pay attention to only a small fraction of the informational signals from other 
countries about policy options). 
171. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 
35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 647-48 (1998) (providing examples of transnational norm entrepreneurs 
and governmental norm sponsors). 
1858 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:6:1817 
transnational interactions on chemical policy, from a path of U.S.-EU 
conflict to one of coordination. 
1. Conflict Interactions on Chemical Policy 
From 2001 to 2006, while REACH was under discussion in 
Europe, conflict was the dominant path of regulatory interaction 
between the United States and Europe over chemical policy. Major 
U.S. chemical companies and industry trade associations were 
concerned about the impact of REACH on their profitability and 
competitiveness.172 And in close cooperation with American industry, 
the Bush Administration launched an unusual lobbying campaign in 
Brussels to stop or weaken REACH. 173 
The campaign began in 2001, when the Department of 
Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") advised the 
American Chemistry Council "to develop an official position and 
strategy as soon as possible to assist in influencing the EU's draft 
text" on REACH.174 Mter consultation with the ACC and major U.S. 
chemical companies, the USTR, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and 
the U.S. Ambassador to the EU, Boyden Gray, began lobbying EU 
counterparts and Member State governments to weaken the initial 
drafts of REACH.175 The campaign included not only traditional 
diplomatic communiques, but also direct lobbying of members of the 
European Parliament by U.S. officials. 176 This direct lobbying was 
widely decried in Europe as inappropriate interference in the EU's 
internal deliberations. Portions of diplomatic communiques from the 
Bush Administration to EU counterparts came from memos prepared 
by the U.S. chemical industry, and U.S. environmental groups 
received only token consultation.177 In June 2004, the U.S. Mission to 
the European Union presented a list of U.S. objections to REACH 
172. H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM-MINORITY STAFF, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., 108TH 
CONG., A SPECIAL INTEREST CASE STUDY: THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 
AND EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO REGULATE CHEMICALS 2 (COMM. PRINT 2004). 
173. For more information on opposition to REACH by the United States, see id. at 2-3; 
GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 137-38, and Marc Schapiro, Toxic Inaction, HARPER'S, Oct. 
2,2007,at78, 81-82. 
174. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note 172, at 4. 
175. See Schapiro, supra note 173, at 81-82 (detailing the reactions to REACH by various 
groups in the United States). 
176. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 102 & n.30 (describing October 9, 2006 email from the U.S. 
Mission to the EU to members of the European Parliament containing the subject line ''REACH 
Second Reading: U.S. Views" and beginning "Attached is our 'voting' list on some of the 
amendments you will be voting on tomorrow"). 
177. GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 137-38; COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note 172, 
at 15. 
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(then still in draft form) to a WTO committee,l78 Although no formal 
WTO complaint against REACH has been filed to date, several 
observers of the U.S. role in REACH deliberations have concluded that 
the United States succeeded in weakening key elements ofREACH.179 
2. Toward a Coordination Path? 
Now that REACH is in force in the EU, there are signs that 
transnational interactions on chemical policy are shifting from a 
conflict path to a coordination path. REACH is creating significant 
regulatory turbulence in the U.S. chemical market, highlighting the 
inadequacies of TSCA and expanding the scope of options that appear 
politically, economically, and scientifically feasible in chemical 
regulation in the United States. 180 While there are other reasons for 
the growing interest in TSCA reform (such as public concern over 
chemicals in toys and baby products), there is little doubt that at the 
state and federal level, REACH is "galvanizing attention on reforming 
TSCA."lSl 
Changes in the U.S. policy debate are occurring at numerous 
levels. In the past five years, several U.S. states have enacted 
legislation to address chemical hazards, an area of environmental law 
traditionally under federal authority. Governors and state legislators 
are looking to Europe for regulatory models.182 As of December 2007, 
178. U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, U.S. SUBMITS COMMENTS ON EC'S REACH 
PROPOSAL TO WTO COMMITTEE, NOTIFICATION G/TBT/N/EEC/52 REGARDING EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION REGULATION COM (2003), available at http://dublin.usembassy.gov/ireland/ 
ecchemical_proposals.html. Among the U.S. concerns presented were that REACH was too 
complex and represented an "unworkable" regulatory approach; that its key definitions and 
terms were vague; that it would disrupt global trade; and that the legislation would impose 
''burdensome analytical, reporting and administrative requirements" on downstream users of 
chemicals. ld. 
179. See, e.g., GREENPEACE, TOXIC LOBBY: HOW THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY IS TRYING TO KILL 
REACH 16-17 (2006), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/contentlinternational 
/press/reports/toxic-lobby-how-the-chemical.pdf ("Such an international lobbying strategy, closely 
coordinated with industry representatives, proved to be extremely effective especially in 
watering down the draft REACH proposal, leading to a much weaker final draft in October 
2003."). 
180. See DITZ, supra note 65, at 2 ("The long stalemate over TSCA is beginning to shift. 
Public concerns about specific chemicals are giving way to a look at systemic failures and root 
causes."). 
181. UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH EUR. UNION CTR. OF EXCELLENCE & UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH 
GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, A NEW EU APPROACH TO CHEMICAL SAFETY: LESSONS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES? A CONFERENCE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) REGULATION PROVIDING FOR 
REGISTRATION, EVALUATION, AUTHORIZATION, AND RESTRICTION OF CHEMICALS (REACH) 10 
(2007), available at http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/events/policyconf/07/PDFs/ReachReport.pdf. 
182. See Michael Wilson & Megan Schwarzman, California Chemicals Policy and the 
European Union, Address at California-EU Regulatory Cooperation Project 3-4 (Feb. 22-23, 
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eleven states had enacted restrictions on brominated flame 
retardants, some of which have been found to be neurotoxins, 
following a 2003 EU ban. 183 In September 2008, Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger of California, spurred by the enactment of REACH, 
signed a landmark green chemistry law that focuses on evaluating 
chemical alternatives and promoting substitution of hazardous 
chemicals.184 And in January 2008, the Massachusetts senate 
unanimously passed "safer alternatives" legislation, designed to 
encourage substitutes for ten known toxic chemicals. 185 The states are 
clearly serving a Brandeisian role as laboratories for policy 
experimentation. If a patchwork of state chemical regulation develops, 
it may provide an impetus for federal chemical policy reform, 
paralleling recent developments in climate change legislation.186 
At the federal level, the Kid-Safe Chemicals Act, 187 which 
amends TSCA and contains several elements inspired by REACH, 188 
2008), available at http:/lrepositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157 &context=igs 
(noting that the California Green Chemistry initiative was spurred, among other things, by the 
enactment of REACH and lack of federal attention to chemical policy reform); see also 
Memorandum from Linda S. Adams, Cal. Sec'y for Envtl. Prot., to Chairpersons and Dirs. of the 
Bds., Dep'ts, and Office 1 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http:/lwww.dtsc.ca.gov/Pollution 
Prevention!GreenChemistryinitiative/u pload/CalEP A_ Green_ Chemistry _Initiative_Memo. pdf 
(noting that in 2007 alone, fifty bills addressing chemical safety and regulation were introduced 
in the California legislature). 
183. See Nat'l Caucus of Envtl. Legislators, Enacted Laws, Executive Orders & 2007 
Introduced Bills: PBDE Legislation (July 13, 2007), available at www.ncel. 
net/articles/PBDE.Legislation.Laws.Website.doc (listing the eleven states with brominated flame 
retardant restrictions); Jennifer 8. Lee, California to Ban Chemicals Used as Flame Retardants, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, at N14 (noting that California followed the EU's lead). 
184. Assem.B. 1879, 2008 Cal. Legis. Serv. 559 (West) (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE §§ 25252-55, 25257); accord. Margot Roosevelt, California Officials Launch 
Green Chemistry Initiative, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at B1; see also S.B. 509, 2008 Ca. Legis. 
Serv. 560 (West) (establishing an online clearinghouse for information on toxic chemicals in 
consumer products). 
185. An Act for a Healthy Massachusetts: Safer Alternatives to Toxic Chemicals, S. 2481, 
2008 Leg., 185th Sess. (Mass. 2008). 
186. See Daryl Ditz, The States and the World: Twin Levers for Reform of U.S. Federal Law 
on Toxic Chemicals, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL 'y 27, 30 (2007) ("The current upsurge of state 
laws on chemicals aims not only to protect their own citizens, but also to create a political 
environment for long overdue national reform."); cf. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and 
Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1533 (2007) 
(arguing that state-level climate change legislation is hitting a political "sweet spot" that is 
creating pressure on federal legislators to adopt a climate change bill). 
187. See Democrats Roll Out Broad Chemical Risk Management Reform Bill, INSIDE EPA 
WKLY. REPORT, May 30, 2008, at 18; accord. Pat Phibbs, Report Lists Actions Congress Could 
Take to Improve EPA Assessments under TSCA, 29 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 702 (July 18, 2005) 
(quoting Sen. Lautenberg: "Europe gave us the inspiration to look hard at our own chemical law 
and ways to improve it."). 
188. Kid-Safe Chemicals Act of 2008, S. 3040, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 6100, 110th Cong. 
(2008); S.1391, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced as the Child, Worker, and Consumer-Safe 
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has been introduced in two separate Congresses, most recently in May 
2008. The bill promotes alternatives to hazardous chemicals, shifts the 
burden to industry to demonstrate "reasonable certainty of no harm" 
from chemical products, limits confidential business information 
claims, and expands biomonitoring for the presence of toxic 
chemicals.189 While the fate of the Kid-Safe Chemicals Act is uncertain 
in the 111 th Congress, prominent members of Congress are 
supporting the use of REACH as a model for legislative reform-they 
are "norm sponsors," in the terminology of Harold Koh. These 
supporters include Henry Waxman, Chair of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, and Barbara Boxer, Chair of the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee,190 both of whom would 
have jurisdiction over a TSCA reform bill. U.S. legislators have the 
advantage of observing the REACH implementation process in Europe 
and learning from Europe's experience with continent-wide chemical 
regulation reform. 
In the small community of U.S. public interest lawyers and 
activists focused on chemical policy, REACH has become a lodestar for 
reform. Scientists and attorneys at groups such as the Environmental 
Defense Fund, the Center for International Environmental Law, 
Environmental Working Group, and the Science and Environmental 
Health Network are acting as "norm entrepreneurs." These groups are 
issuing detailed reports on REACH, developing a media strategy, and 
providing testimony before legislative bodies to promote REACH as an 
important model for the United States. The enactment of REACH has 
increased NGO calls for a systematic overhaul of U.S. chemical policy, 
shifting the focus from ad hoc bans or restrictions on specific 
chemicals. 191 The activist community has been buoyed by progress at 
the state level and by a series of stinging reports on federal chemical 
Chemicals Act of 2005). Sen. Lautenberg has indicated he intends to introduce the Kid-Safe 
Chemicals Act in the lllth Congress. Scientific Integrity and Transparency Reforms at the 
Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing Before the H. Comm. and Subcomm. on Oversight, 
lllth Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg), available at http://lautenberg. 
senate.gov/newsroom/Hearings/060909.cfm. 
189. S. 3040 § 3. The Kid-Safe Chemicals Act mandates that all existing and new chemicals 
be reviewed for prioritization, that a priority list of at least 300 chemicals be developed by EPA, 
and that EPA determine whether the manufacturer has met the "reasonable certainty of no 
harm" test within three years of a chemical being placed on the list. 
190. See H.R. 6100 (listing Waxman as a co-sponsor); Zachary Coile, EPA Was Stymied by 
White House, GAO Reports, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2008, at A1 (indicating Boxer's support for 
chemical regulation reform). 
191. See REINEKE, supra note 131, at 4 ("NGOs believe that a more comprehensive approach 
is needed and would like to see some paradigm shifts similar to the ones REACH was aiming 
for."). 
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regulation by the GAO.l92 While activist pressure on chemical policy 
has primarily been directed at the state and federal governments, 
activists may also begin to target particular firms deemed recalcitrant 
on issues of chemical testing and disclosure. 193 The movement for 
chemical policy reform is still inchoate in the United States, 194 but 
there is no doubt that REACH has become an influential regulatory 
model and has emboldened U.S. environmental activists. 
In predicting whether the United States will adopt REACH-
like reforms, the stance of the U.S. chemical industry is the major 
wildcard. Will we see a "California effect" in chemical policy, in which 
pressure from chemical manufacturers to harmonize U.S. regulation 
with REACH will lead to a ratcheting up of the stringency of U.S. law? 
Or will the U.S. chemical industry attempt to block TSCA reform with 
the same intensity with which it attempted to weaken REACH in 
Europe? In Senate testimony in February 2009, Cal Dooley, the CEO 
of the American Chemistry Council, stated emphatically that "ACC is 
not advocating the adoption of the European Union's REACH 
system."195 Nonetheless, in a notable shift from prior positions, Dooley 
also stated in the same hearing that Congress should ''begin the effort 
to modernize TSCA."196 In August 2009, the ACC followed up this 
statement by releasing a set of ten principles that should guide TSCA 
reform.l97 The debate is now shifting from whether TSCA should be 
reformed to when and how reform should occur. 
There is some precedent for a "California effect" unfolding 
through U.S.-ED interactions in chemical regulation. In the late 
1970s, in the wake of the U.S. adoption of TSCA, European chemical 
companies began to support Community-wide chemical legislation 
modeled on TSCA. The European chemical industry advocated that 
chemical regulation be shifted from the Member States to the 
Community level to provide a counterweight to the United States and 
192. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 3-6; GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 30, at 2; GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 39, at 2-16. 
193. See David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, Strategic Activism and Non-Market Strategy 4 
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=897324 (noting that 
activist campaigns may target manufacturers directly or may aim further "downstream," such as 
by boycotting retailers that sell goods from certain manufacturers). 
194. See GEISER & TICKNER, supra note 97, at 144 (noting that "the U.S. is at least several 
years behind European countries in public discussions on chemicals."). 
195. Revisiting the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111 th Cong. 2 
(2009) (Statement of Cal Dooley, President, Am. Chemistry Council) (emphasis in original), 
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111120090226/testimony _ace. pdf. 
196. Id. at 1. 
197. AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, TEN PRINCIPLES FOR MODERNIZING TSCA (2009), 
available at http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/sec_mediakits.asp?CID=2178&DID=9938. 
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to ensure that enactment of TSCA did not create trade barriers with 
Europe.l98 As the leading academic study of this process concluded: 
"The chemical industry's desire to minimize differential treatment for 
products across national lines provide[d] a powerful economic impetus 
for the selection of common regulatory targets."199 Similarly, if the 
regulatory differences between TSCA and REACH create duplicative 
testing requirements or impediments to transatlantic trade, a 
California effect could emerge in which the U.S. chemical industry 
begins to support conforming changes to TSCA. 
Another possibility is that as U.S. chemical companies become 
accustomed to REACH compliance, their opposition to substantial 
TSCA reform may soften. Defeating proposals to mandate testing and 
maintaining exemptions for existing chemicals may become less 
compelling legislative goals for American chemical companies as these 
same companies undertake the required toxicity research for both 
existing and new chemicals under REACH. And once multinational 
firms have produced the required health and safety information about 
their chemicals in Europe, there is little reaso~ for them to object to 
EPA disclosure requirements for the same information. Such firms 
may, in fact, lobby for similar mandatory testing and disclosure rules 
in the United States to level the playing field with domestic 
competitors that do not do business in Europe. Gradual adjustment to 
REACH by U.S. industry could provide a political opening for 
significant amendments to TSCA, especially as the limits of voluntary 
initiatives on chemical testing become more apparent. 200 
198. Giandomenico Majone, Cross-National Sources of Regulatory Policy-Making in Europe 
and the United States, 11 J. PUB. POL'y 79, 98 (1991). 
199. BRICKMAN, ET AL., supra note 72, at 302-03. 
200. The limits of the High Production Volume Challenge program were discussed supra, 
notes 66-67. The future of a second voluntary testing program for lower production volume 
chemicals, called the Chemical Assessment and Management Program ("ChAMP"), is in question 
due to EPA's surprise June 2009 decision to suspend risk assessments under the program. 
Cheryl Hogue, EPA Suspends Part of Chemicals Program, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, 
June 19, 2009, available at http://pubs.acs.org/cenlnews/87/i25/8725news7.html. The ChAMP 
program, launched at the end of the Bush Administration, was widely seen as an attempt by the 
Administration to head off the pressure for REACH-like legislation in the United States. To 
Head off REACH Effort, EPA Unveils a Series of Fixes for TSCA Rules, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., 
Mar. 21, 2008, at 6; see also Industry Intensifies Lobbying Against 'REACH'-Like Chemical Bills, 
INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., June 20, 2008, at 4, 5. ChAMP was criticized by the NGO community, 
see Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, ChAMP Just Doesn't Have the REACH (May 2, 2008), 
available at http://www.edf.org/pressrelease.cfm?ContentiD=7873, and the suspension of the 
ChAMP risk assessments may indicate that EPA is reconsidering its overall approach to 
chemical regulation. 
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3. Information Disclosure and the Spread of European Legal 
Norms on Chemical Regulation 
In assessing transnational regulatory interactions in the 
chemical field, it is important to look beyond questions of legislative 
change in the United States. Regulatory turbulence can alter the 
economic, legal, political, and informational landscape of foreign 
jurisdictions, even absent any changes in national legislation-indeed, 
even over the strong objections of national officials. It is in this realm 
of business and consumer culture that REACH is likely to work its 
most dramatic effects in the United States, at least in the near term. 
Under the extraterritorial influence of REACH, the U.S. chemical 
marketplace may increasingly be governed by European legal norms. 
Information disclosure in Europe is the key driver of these 
effects in the United States. By putting critical toxicity data in the 
hands of consumers, activists, attorneys, and state regulators in the 
United States, REACH will likely improve public health and 
environmental protection and spark substitution of hazardous 
chemicals, even without legislative changes to TSCA. 
REACH will cause regulatory turbulence through four major 
types of informational spillover effects in the United States. First, U.S. 
chemical companies may incorporate EU toxicity testing and 
information disclosure norms into their own internal practices. For 
example, Dow Chemical announced in early 2008 that it will prepare 
REACH-qualifying dossiers on all its products, regardless of whether 
those products are actually being sold in Europe. 201 If other major 
chemical manufacturers follow, we could see a "regulatory revolution 
by surprise"202 in which the EU's own internal legislation quickly 
becomes the global standard followed by multinational chemical 
firms. 203 
201. UNIV. OF PITISBURGH EUR. UNION CTR. OF EXCELLENCE & UNIV. OF PITISBURGH 
GRADUATE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 181, at 40. This may be indicative of a larger trend 
toward public disclosure of potential chemical risks by U.S. firms. In March 2009, the SC 
Johnson Co., manufacturer of Windex, Shout, Glade, and other household products, announced 
that it would voluntarily disclose product ingredients on the Internet. Press Release, SC 
Johnson, Phthalates Phasing Out and Innovative Ingredient Communication Launched (Mar. 12, 
2009), available at http://www.scjohnson.com/family/fam_pre_pre_news.asp?art_id=390. The 
website containing the ingredient disclosures is available at http://whatsinsidescjohnson.com. 
202. David Levi-Faur & Jacint Jordana, Preface: The Making of a New Regulatory Order, 598 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 6, 8 (2005). 
203. As the UC-Berkeley political scientist David Vogel has stated, in explaining the growing 
influence of EU environmental standards: "Even if a country does not adopt [European] 
standards, the firms that export to the EU do. And since most firms do export to the EU, they 
have adopted the EU's more stringent standards." Buck, supra note 9, at 13. 
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Second, REACH toxicity data will increasingly shape the 
chemical purchasing decisions of U.S. manufacturers, retailers, and 
consumers. REACH will likely promote the nascent green chemistry 
movement in the United States by closing data gaps, allowing 
comparative analysis of chemical risks, and providing a competitive 
advantage to safer products. Indeed, REACH may provide a spark for 
innovations in U.S. product safety that would be impossible to achieve 
without plentiful background information on chemical risks. U.S. 
manufacturers that purchase chemicals in bulk will now have the 
capability to track REACH disclosures in Europe, which may affect 
the chemical products they buy and the suppliers they choose. U.S. 
manufacturers may begin to require REACH compliance (or 
equivalent disclosures of toxicity data) as a condition of their 
purchases from chemical suppliers in the United States.204 
Much of this U.S. private sector response to REACH could 
become contractually obligated. For instance, representations and 
warranties on REACH compliance may become standard terms in 
purchase and sale contracts between U.S. and European firms. And 
European chemical importers, subject to REACH registration 
requirements, may contractually "push down" the testing and data 
compilation requirements of REACH onto their U.S. suppliers. 
The implementation of REACH will also affect U.S. retailers 
and their customers. Hundreds of chemicals that will likely be subject 
to authorization under REACH (because of their carcinogenicity, 
adverse reproductive effects, or potential to bioaccumulate) are widely 
marketed in the United States.205 In response to EU decisions naming 
such substances as "very high concern" chemicals, U.S. retailers may 
voluntarily withdraw those same substances from the U.S. market, or 
the chemicals may lose market share-a process that industry 
204. See Samuel Boxerman, Christopher Bell, & Kristina Nordlander, Are You Ready for 
REACH?, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Mar. 2008, at 38-39 (noting that "the initial and most visible 
impact of REACH might be seen in contracts, purchase orders, and so-called 'supplier 
declarations' [on compliance with REACH]"). 
205. In a 2008 study, which was updated in January 2009, the Environmental Defense Fund 
examined 267 chemicals that it believed met the definition of "very high concern" chemicals 
subject to authorization under REACH. It then examined the commercial profile of these same 
chemicals in the United States. It found that at least 37 percent of these chemicals are currently 
being produced or imported into the United States above 25,000 pounds annually, that at least 
235 different companies are producing or importing these chemicals in the United States, and 
that only about one third of these chemicals have been subject to testing under TSCA or under 
voluntary programs such as the HPV Challenge. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF. FuND, 
ACROSS THE POND: AsSESSING REACH'S FIRST BIG IMPACT ON U.S. COMPANIES AND CHEMICALS 
4-5, (2008, rev. 2009). 
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insiders call chemical "deselection."206 Major retailers such as Wal-
Mart may order their suppliers to cease use of chemicals on the EU 
authorization list, 207 and consumers in the United States may avoid 
products that contain chemicals subject to authorization in Europe, in 
a kind of ''black-list" effect. 208 As Ernie Rosenberg, President of the 
U.S. Soap and Detergent Association, has explained, "When you 
regulate a chemical product, it has a global impact in the global 
information environment that we live in. An adverse finding about a 
chemical anywhere creates problems for that chemical everywhere."209 
A third informational spillover effect from REACH is that U.S. 
federal regulators can use the toxicity data from Europe in existing 
regulatory regimes, including TSCA and other environmental laws. 
There is clearly sufficient overlap between the chemical regulatory 
regimes in the United States and the EU such that toxicity data 
disclosed under REACH could, in many cases, have direct legal 
relevance under TSCA. EPA could rely on data disclosed under 
REACH, for instance, to support further testing requirements under 
Section 4 of TSCA.210 Under Section ll(c) of TSCA, EPA would have 
the authority to subpoena documents prepared by U.S. firms in the 
process of complying with REACH. 211 And Section 8(e) of TSCA 
imposes a mandatory reporting duty when a firm obtains "information 
which reasonably supports the conclusion" that a chemical "presents a 
206. Ernie Rosenberg, Changes Do Not Necessarily Bring About Change, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,074, 10,076 (Jan. 2009) (noting that deselection can happen quickly because 
unlike formal legal controls on chemicals, purchasing decisions "are not subject to legal, political, 
or scientific discipline."). 
207. 2007 Outlook: REACH, New Regulations in U.S. States Suggest Volatile Year for 
Manufacturers, 12 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), at B-2 (Jan. 19, 2007); accord. WAL-MART, 
SUSTAINABILITY PROGRESS TO DATE 2007-2008, at 56, available at http://walmartstores.com/sites/ 
sustainabilityreport/2007/documents/SustainabilityProgressToDate2007-2008.pdf. 
208. See MICHAEL WALLS, REACH 101: UNDERSTANDING AND PREPARING FOR THE NEW EU 
CHEMICALS LEGISLATION 638 (2008), available at http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/ 
datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CN044_chapter_27_thumb.pdf (noting the "black-list" effect of being 
placed on the candidate list for authorization). Consumers may become aware of the chemical 
constituents of products sold in the United States through the disclosure requirements of 
REACH Article 33, which mandates disclosure and safe handling instructions for any articles 
sold in Europe that contain substances of very high concern. While REACH primarily applies to 
raw chemical inputs, rather than to finished consumer products, Article 33 is a notable 
exception. It will, for the first time, require disclosures of many hazardous product ingredients. 
209. Stefan Baumgarten, Regulatory Bubble, ICIS CHEMICAL Bus., Jan. 21, 2008, at 14. 
210. See TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) and discussion supra notes 30, 52-59 and 
accompanying text, for further explanation of TSCA testing and information requirements. 
211. TSCA § ll(c). EPA would have to be willing to use its existing subpoena power to 
obtain these documents. But see Greenwood, supra note 80, at 10,039 (noting that EPA has 
"virtually ignored" its Section 11 subpoena power to date). 
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substantial risk of injury to health or the environment."212 The United 
States is a party to OECD agreements on mutual recognition of 
chemical testing data and would likely be able to use EU data in 
TSCA decisionmaking. 213 REACH chemical toxicity and risk 
assessment data might also be used by federal agencies to make 
regulatory decisions under other environmental and public health 
laws, such as establishing cleanup standards for hazardous waste 
sites, establishing standards for food packaging or cosmetics, or 
addressing emerging regulatory issues around nanotechnology. 
Finally, information disclosure under REACH is likely to have 
significant impacts on subnational environmental regulation in the 
United States. As states consider bans or restrictions on certain 
classes of chemicals, the toxicity data from Europe-as well as EU 
decisions on which chemicals are of "very high concern"-is likely to be 
influential.214 Additionally, chemical toxicity data disclosed under 
REACH could be used by plaintiffs' attorneys in the United States as 
the basis for tort suits over occupational or other chemical exposures. 
These suits have traditionally been very difficult to bring because of 
problems in proving causation, long latency periods, and a lack of 
basic toxicity data on commonly used chemicals.215 The REACH data 
that will be generated in Europe over the next decade represents a 
wealth of information on chemical toxicity that has long been absent 
from American courtrooms. 216 
212. TSCA § 8(e); see also discussion of EPA's prior implementation of Section 8, supra note 
48. 
213. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Decision 
Concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(81)30 
(May 12, 1981), as amended by OECD, OECD Doc. C(97)186 (Nov. 26, 1997), available at http:// 
webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontalloecdacts.nsffiinkto/C(81)30; OECD, Decision-Recommendation 
on Compliance with Principles of Good Laboratory Practice, OECD Doc. C(89)87 (Oct. 2, 1989), as 
amended by OECD, OECD Doc. C(95)8 (Mar. 9, 1995), available at http://webdominol.oecd. 
org/horizontalloecdacts.nsffiinkto/C(89)87. 
214. See MICHAEL P. WILSON ET AL., GREEN CHEMISTRY IN CALIFORNIA, A FRAMEWORK FOR 
LEADERSHIP IN CHEMICALS POLICY AND INNOVATION 63 (2006), available at http://coeh. 
berkeley.edu/docs/news/06_wilson_policy.pdf (arguing that REACH represents an opportunity for 
California "to gather information on the physical attributes and basic toxicological properties of 
many chemicals in commercial circulation" in the state). 
215. See Sachs, supra note 3, at 326-41 (outlining hurdles to bringing tort suits over 
chemical exposures). 
216. See Black, supra note 92, at A127 (stating that "information provided by REACH should 
begin to help overcome the difficulty in linking specific health problems with exposures to 
specific chemicals or mixtures of chemicals"); MARSH INC., REACH: NEW EU REGULATION FOR 
THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY 3 (2007), available at http://global.marsh.com/documents/ 
Internationalbriefings/REACH_International_Bulletin.pdf (noting that information generated for 
REACH compliance could be used in litigation in non-EU jurisdictions). 
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It is clear that information disclosure under REACH will have 
a number of regulatory and non-regulatory ripple effects in the United 
States. These effects from foreign legislation suggest that scholars in 
the information-and-environment field need to look beyond U.S. 
borders. American environmental law scholars have frequently 
focused on how to amend TSCA to require, or incentivize, more 
extensive toxicity testing for chemicals.217 But it now appears that 
REACH will become the principal source of this much-needed increase 
in the supply of chemical toxicity information in the United States, 
and globally. If chemical toxicity data is an informational commons, as 
Wendy Wagner has suggested, 218 then it is a global commons, 
unconstrained by jurisdictional fences. New scholarship in the 
information-and-environment field must consider how these global 
information flows can be harnessed to improve U.S. environmental 
regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Chemical regulation is a case study in the politics of 
transnational regulatory interactions and information flows in the era 
of globalization. The international system is no longer characterized 
by sharp dividing lines between domestic and international law. 
Instead, innovations in domestic environmental law can become the 
springboard for transnational changes in regulatory policy. Similarly, 
transnational legal developments can shape domestic regulatory 
environments. 
That EU legislation is now setting the terms of debate over 
chemical policy in the United States is a remarkable departure from 
past trends, in which the United States was the principal source of 
transnational regulatory innovation in environmental law. In 
chemical regulation, there is little doubt that policy currents from the 
EU are blowing westward across the Atlantic, putting the United 
States in the unfamiliar position of reacting to developments in the 
EU's internal environmental law. 
As this Article has shown, while TSCA reform is by no means 
inevitable, the implementation of REACH does make reform more 
likely. New reform coalitions will emerge, toxicity data will become 
217. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 2, at 631 (arguing that existing incentives not to 
undertake toxicity testing could be reversed if manufacturers could petition EPA to have their 
products certified as superior from the standpoint of safety); Applegate, Perils of Unreasonable 
Risk, supra note 3, at 328-29 (advocating replacement of the "substantial evidence" standard for 
judicial review of TSCA test orders with an "arbitrary and capricious" standard). 
218. See Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 3, at 1622-25. 
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available from the EU, and longstanding industry arguments that 
TSCA is adequately protective of human health and the environment 
will be undermined by the more stringent regulatory regime across 
the Atlantic. 
Can the United States simply free ride on the data from 
Europe? Globalization and modern communications technology 
certainly create the possibility that a single large jurisdiction, such as 
the EU, could become what Anne-Marie Slaughter has called a "global 
information agency,"219 coordinating research, testing, and disclosure 
of risk data that other jurisdictions could then rely upon for their own 
environmental regulation. 
But there is reason to be skeptical that the broken chemical 
regulatory regime in the United States could be fixed solely through 
such free riding, without substantial reform to TSCA. TSCA suffers 
both from limited data supply and from stringent informational 
demands prior to regulation. REACH data from Europe will help close 
the supply side of the data gap in the United States, with the many 
positive effects discussed above. But as long as TSCA maintains its 
complex procedural requirements, its governmental burden of proof, 
and its high hurdles to restrict a chemical under Section 6, a gap will 
persist between information supply and information needs. 
A comprehensive fix of chemical regulation in the United 
States will require piercing the armor that has protected TSCA from 
significant amendment for more than three decades. The United 
States should aspire to be a leader in chemical safety and product 
sustainability, and TSCA reform is essential to that task. The main 
principles of REACH-such as "No Data, No Market"; ending 
distinctions between new and existing chemicals; substitution for 
hazardous chemicals; and increased public disclosure of risk 
information-point the way toward the next generation of chemical 
regulation in the United States. 
219. SLAUGHTER, supra note 139, at 156-65. 
